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Improved Quantum Key Distribution Networks Based on Blom-Scheme

  • Ya-Qi Song
  • Li YangEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 255)

Abstract

With the mature implement of point-to-point quantum key distribution (QKD) system, QKD networks become the focal points of the research. In general, QKD network is a simple extension of point-to-point QKD systems. An N-user QKD network is constructed with \(O(N^2)\) point-to-point QKD systems, which consumes a great deal of resources. We first propose an improved QKD network based on Blom-scheme, which reduces the number of point-to-point QKD systems from \(O(N^2)\) to O(N) and maintains unconditional secure. Then we develop it to a multiple-centre network. Moreover, as denial-of-service is a normal and effective attack on quantum communication system, we creatively construct a network architecture based on block design against the attack. Our network architecture can reduce the cost of the quantum channels greatly and improve the survivability compared to the existing QKD networks.

Keywords

Quantum key distribution Key distribution network Unconditional secure Denial-of-service Block design 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61672517), National Cryptography Development Fund (Grant No. MMJJ20170108) and the Fundamental theory and cutting edge technology Research Program of Institute of Information Engineering, CAS (Grant No. Y7Z0301 103).

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.Data Assurance and Communication Security Research CenterChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  3. 3.School of Cyber SecurityUniversity of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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