Advertisement

Isocracy pp 91-145 | Cite as

The Political Institutions of Isocracy

  • Nicolò BellancaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)

Abstract

In this chapter, starting with an appreciation of radical conflicts (antagonistic but non-destructive), the political institutions of isocracy are illustrated through five perspectives, partial but complementary to each other. The reputation of impartiality animates assemblies devoted to the preventive check of laws and independent authorities that follow a liberal tradition combining the Montesquieu approach with Friedrich August von Hayek’s proposals. The diffused power favours, inter alia, the electoral mandate with the right of revocation and the referendum with a preliminary random selection of participating citizens. In addition, it allows control over the financial remuneration of elected representatives and establishes that each citizen receives a token in currency that he can use to finance the electoral campaign of some candidate. The power-sharing incentivizes, inter alia, the proportional distribution of positions and resources, the positive discrimination policies and the multilateral horizontal surveillance (with which the members of each group submit their political actions to the scrutiny of the peer members of all the other groups). A “partisan” institution is, for instance, the multiple votes, taken from John Stuart Mill but applied to the parents of minors (including single-parent families, those with more than two parents and those made up of same-sex parents) in order to grant political representation to those who are not given a voice on the grounds of age. Another one is the “tribunate”, a peculiar form of counter-power (with the option to place a veto on choices not agreed upon) retrieved from Machiavelli and the tradition of republicanism. Finally, in tune with the polyarchic method that is the underlining fil rouge of the whole treatise, the federalist institutions also play a very important role. Multiple non-state governments, or jurisdictions, can perform all public functions, apart from a few crucial public goods, whose provision is assigned, through constitutionally defined procedures, only to one jurisdiction. This configuration is extended on a planetary scale in order to establish a multipolar and multilevel balance of power.

References

  1. Abizadeh, Arash. 2012. On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem. American Political Science Review 106 (4): pp. 867–882. Google Scholar
  2. Acemoglu, Daron K., and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Ackerman, Bruce, and Ian Ayres. 2002. Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Ackerman, Bruce, and James S. Fishkin. 2004. Deliberation Day. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Adelman, David E., and Kirsten H. Engel. 2009. Adaptive Environmental Federalism. In William W. Buzbee (ed.), Preemptive Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 277–300.Google Scholar
  6. Adamson, Walter L. 1989. Convergences in Recent Democratic Theory. Theory and Society 18 (1): pp. 125–142. Google Scholar
  7. Anderson, Terry H. 2004. The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Arendt, Hanna. 1970. Civil Disobedience. In Crises of the Republic. Orlando: Harcourt Brace & co., 1972.Google Scholar
  9. Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  10. Barrett, Scott. 2007. Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Beetham, David. 2005. Democracy. Oxford: Oneworld.Google Scholar
  12. Bellanca, Nicolò. 2007. L’economia del Noi. Dall’Azione Collettiva alla Partecipazione Politica. Milano: Università Bocconi editore.Google Scholar
  13. Bennett, Lance W., and Alexandra Segerberg. 2013. The Logic of Connective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Bernheim, John. 1985. Is Democracy Possible? Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  15. Boadway, Robin, and Anwar Shah. 2009. Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practices of Multiorder Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Bobbio, Norberto. 1979. Il Problema della Guerra e le Vie della Pace. Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  17. Bobbio, Norberto. 1985. Stato, Governo, Società. Torino: Einaudi.Google Scholar
  18. Bobbio, Norberto. 1987. The Future of Democracy. Minneapolis: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  19. Bosniak, Linda. 2006. The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Braithwaite, Valerie. 2009. Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy. Cheltenam: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  21. Brosio, Giorgio, and Stefano Piperno. 2009. Governo e Finanza Locale, IV ed. Torino: Giappichelli.Google Scholar
  22. Cagé, Julia. 2015. Saving the Media. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.Google Scholar
  23. Campiglio, Luigi. 1997. Political Participation, Voting, and Economic Policy: Three Problems of Modern Democracies. In Albert Breton, et al. (eds.), Understanding Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 196–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Campiglio, Luigi. 1998. Prima le Donne e i Bambini. Chi Rappresenta i Minorenni? Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  25. Casella, Alessandra, and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. Elements of a Theory of Jurisdictional Change. In Barry Eichengreen, Jeffry Frieden, and Jürgen von Hagen (eds.), Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe. New York and Heidelberg: Springer.Google Scholar
  26. Castells, Manuel. 2009. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Catalano, Pierangelo. 1971. Tribunato e Resistenza. Torino: Paravia.Google Scholar
  28. Cohen, Joshua, and Charles Sabel. 1997. Directly-Deliberative Poliarchy. European Law Journal 3 (4): pp. 313–340.Google Scholar
  29. Costituzione della Repubblica italiana illustrata con i lavori preparatori. Roma: Colombo, 1969.Google Scholar
  30. Dahl, Robert. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Davies, Thomas. 2014. NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Downs, Anthony. 1957a. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65 (2): pp. 135–150. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Downs, Anthony. 1957b. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
  34. Dryzek, John S. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  35. Duverger, Maurice. 1972. Janus: les Deux Faces de l’Occident. Paris: Fayard.Google Scholar
  36. Eichenberger, Reiner, and Bruno S. Frey. 2002. Democratic Governance for a Globalized World. Kyklos 55 (2): pp. 272–274.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press.Google Scholar
  38. Ferrara, Alessandro. 2005. Prefazione to the Italian edition of Bruce Ackerman, La Costituzione di emergenza. Come salvaguardare libertà e diritti civili di fronte al pericolo di terrorismo. Roma: Meltemi, 2004.Google Scholar
  39. Fornara, Charles W., and Loren J. Samons. 1991. Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  40. Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, and Daniela Marchesi. 2006. Economia e Politica Economica del Diritto. Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  41. Frey, Bruno S., and Reiner Eichenberger. 1999. The New Democratic Federalism for Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  42. Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer. 2007. Citizenship and Democracy in International Organizations. In José Casas Pardo and Pedro Schwartz (eds.), Public Choice and the Challenge of Democracy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  43. Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer. 2013. Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution. In Stefan Voigt (ed.), Design of Constitutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  44. Goodin, Robert E. Goodin. 2017. Enfranchising All Subjected, Worldwide. International Theory 8 (3): pp. 365–389.Google Scholar
  45. Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press.Google Scholar
  46. Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1973–79. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  47. Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1978. Denationalisation of Money. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.Google Scholar
  48. Held, David. 2006. Models of Democracy, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  49. Held, David, and Anthony G. McGrew. 2003. Introduction to David Held & Anthony G. McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  50. Hirschman, Albert O. 1994. Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society. In Jeremy Edelman (ed.), The Essential Hirschman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 345–362.Google Scholar
  51. Holmes, Stephen. 2003. Lineages of the Rule of Law. In José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski (eds.), Democracy and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  52. Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  53. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.Google Scholar
  54. Jarstad, Anna K. 2013. Sharing Power to Build States. In David Chandler and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding. London: Routledge, pp. 246–256.Google Scholar
  55. Jasay, Anthony de. 1997. Against Politics. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  56. Kaul, Inge, et al. (eds.). 2003. Providing Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  57. Keating, Michael. 2001. Plurinational Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Kellner, Menachem Marc. 1975. Democracy and Civil Disobedience. The Journal of Politics 37 (4): pp. 899–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Kelsen, Hans. 1945. General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  60. Kelsen, Hans. 1955. Foundations of Democracy. Ethics 66 (1), part II: pp. 1–101. Google Scholar
  61. King, Roger. 2007. The Regulatory State in an Age of Governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  62. Koppell, Jonathan. 2010. World Rule. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Lamberton, Cait, Jan‐Emmanuel De Neve, and Michael I. Norton. 2018. The Power of Voice in Stimulating Morality: Eliciting Taxpayer Preferences Increases Tax Compliance. Journal of Consumer Psychology 28 (2): pp. 310–328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Landau, Jean-Pierre. 2004. Les Nouvelle Contributions Financières Internationales. http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/044000440.pdf. Accessed September 15, 2017.
  65. Lijphart, Arend. 2007. Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  66. Lipping, Jüri. 2010. Sovereignty Beyond the State. In Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Sovereignty in Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: Doubleday and Company Inc.Google Scholar
  68. Listokin, Yair, and David M. Schizer. 2013. I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System. Tax Law Review 66: pp. 179–216.Google Scholar
  69. Lobrano, Giovanni. 1982. Il Potere dei Tribuni della Plebe. Milano: Giuffrè.Google Scholar
  70. Lobrano, Giovanni. 1996. Res Publica Res Populi. La Legge e la Limitazione del Potere. Torino: Giappichelli.Google Scholar
  71. Long, Roderick T., and Tibor R. Machan (eds.). 2008. Anarchism/Minarchism. London: Routledge. Google Scholar
  72. Lottieri, Carlo. 2001. Il Pensiero Libertario Contemporaneo. Macerata: Liberilibri.Google Scholar
  73. Maas, Willem. 2017. Multilevel Citizenship. In Ayelet Shacar et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  74. Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  75. Markoff, John. 1996. Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.Google Scholar
  76. Markoff, John. 1999. From Center to Periphery and Back Again: Reflections on the Geography of Democratic Innovation. In Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (eds.), Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 229–246.Google Scholar
  77. Marshall, Thomas H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  78. Martinelli, Alberto. 2004. La Democrazia Globale. Milano: Università Bocconi editore.Google Scholar
  79. Matteucci, Nicola. 1983. Sovranità. In Norberto Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci, and Gianfranco Pasquino (eds.), Dizionario di Politica. Torino: Utet.Google Scholar
  80. McCormick, John P. 2001. Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism. American Political Science Review 95 (2): pp. 297–313. Google Scholar
  81. McCormick, John P. 2011. Machiavellian Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  82. McGuire, Martin C., and Mancur Olson. 1996. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1): pp. 72–96. Google Scholar
  83. Melucci, Alberto. 1996a. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  84. Melucci, Alberto. 1996b. The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  85. Miglio, Gianfranco. 1992. Come Cambiare. Le mie Riforme. Milano: Mondadori.Google Scholar
  86. Mill, John Stuart Mill. 1861. Considerations on Representative Government. Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009.Google Scholar
  87. Miller, David. 2003. Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  88. Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat de. 1748. The Spirit of Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.Google Scholar
  89. Morrow, Duncan. 2005. Breaking Antagonism? Political leadership in Divided Societies. In Ian O’Flynn and David Russell (eds.), Power Sharing. London: Pluto Press.Google Scholar
  90. Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. On the Political. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  91. Mueller, Dennis C., Robert D. Tollison, and Thomas D. Willett. 1972. Representative Democracy via Random Selection. Public Choice 12: pp. 57–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  92. Mueller, Dennis C. 1978. Voting by Veto. Journal of Public Economics 10 (1): pp. 57–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  93. Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  94. Nemo, Philippe. 1988. La Société du Droit selon F. A. Hayek. Paris: PUF.Google Scholar
  95. Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  96. Panebianco, Angelo. 2004. Il Potere, lo Stato, la Libertà. Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  97. Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  98. Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  99. Pizzorno, Alessandro. 2007. Il Velo della Diversità. Studi su Razionalità e Riconoscimento. Milano: Feltrinelli.Google Scholar
  100. Pogge, Thomas W. 1994. Cosmopolitanism and Sovreignty. In Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  101. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  102. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  103. Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  104. Rensi, Giuseppe. 1902. La Democrazia Diretta. Milano: Adelphi, 1995.Google Scholar
  105. Rhodes, P. J. 2015. The Congruence of Power: Ruling and Being Ruled in Greek Participatory Communities. In Dean Hammer (ed.), A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
  106. Riker, William H. 1987. The Development of American Federalism. Dordrecht: Kluver.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  107. Robinson, James A. 2006. Economic Development and Democracy. Annual Review of Political Science 9: pp. 503–527.Google Scholar
  108. Rodden, Jonathan A. 2006. Hamilton’s Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  109. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 1992. Le Sacre du Citoyen. Histoire du Suffrage Universel en France. Paris: Gallimard.Google Scholar
  110. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2006. Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
  111. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Democratic Legitimacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.Google Scholar
  112. Rothbard, Murray. 1982. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: Humanities Press.Google Scholar
  113. Roussillon, Henry. 2008. Le Conseil Constitutionnel. Paris: Dalloz.Google Scholar
  114. Ruggie, John G. 1993. Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. International Organization 47 (1): pp. 139–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  115. Sandler, Todd. 1997. Global Challenges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  116. Sandler, Todd. 2004. Global Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  117. Sandler, Todd. 2010. Overcoming Global and Regional Collective Action Impediments. Global Policy 1 (1): pp. 40–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  118. Sartori, Giovanni. 2000, Democrazia: Cosa è, 2nd ed. Milano: Rizzoli.Google Scholar
  119. Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  120. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge, 2003.Google Scholar
  121. Screpanti, Ernesto. 2013. Mandato Elettorale con Diritto di Revoca, http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/screpanti/. Accessed September 15, 2017.
  122. Serra, Teresa. 2002. La Disobbedienza Civile. Torino: Giappichelli.Google Scholar
  123. Shachar, Ayelet. 2009. The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  124. Shapiro, Robert A. 2009. Polyphonic Federalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  125. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  126. Smith, Graham. 2009. Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  127. Song, Sarah. 2009. Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights. Citizenship Studies 13 (6): pp. 607–620. Google Scholar
  128. Stedman Jones, Gareth, and Gregory Claeys (eds.). 2011. The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  129. Stoppino, Mario. 1974. Élites, democrazia e partecipazione politica. In Potere ed Élites Politiche. Milano: Giuffrè, 2000.Google Scholar
  130. Thorley, John. 1996. Athenian Democracy, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  131. Thucydides, about 400 B.C. History of the Peloponnesian War. London: Penguin, 1974.Google Scholar
  132. Toesca, Pietro M. 1998. Teoria del Potere Diffuso. Milano: Elèuthera.Google Scholar
  133. Vanberg, Viktor J. 2001. The Constitution of Markets. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  134. Verhulst, Jos, and Arjen Nijeboer. 2007. Direct Democracy: Facts and Arguments about the Introduction of Initiative and Referendum. Brussels: Democracy International.Google Scholar
  135. Walzer, Michael. 2000. Governing the Globe. In Arguing about War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.Google Scholar
  136. Wellisch, Dietmar. 2004. Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  137. Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of American Republic, 1776–1787. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FlorenceFlorenceItaly

Personalised recommendations