Coalitional Games in Evolutionary Supply Chain Networks

  • Laura ScrimaliEmail author
Part of the AIRO Springer Series book series (AIROSS, volume 1)


We focus on the coalition formation in a supply chain network that consists of three layers of decision-makers, namely, suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers, with prices and shipments that evolve over time. We suppose that some partners in the chain vertically merge each other and act as one player to confront the other players that make their choices independently. In this model, the retailer is the dominant player and is a profit-maximizer. We present a non-cooperative approach to the coalitional game and provide the equilibrium conditions governing the model as well as an equivalent evolutionary variational inequality formulation.


Evolutionary variational inequality Supply chain Coalitions Nash equilibrium 



The research was partially supported by the research project “Modelli Matematici nell’Insegnamento-Apprendimento della Matematica” DMI, University of Catania. This support is gratefully acknowledged.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of CataniaCataniaItaly

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