First-Time Interaction Under Revenue-Sharing Contract and Asymmetric Beliefs of Supply-Chain Members
The paper provides a thorough investigation of a first-time interaction between a retailer and a manufacturer who are unreliable in a cost function of the manufacturer. We consider a two-echelon supply chain of a single customized product, where parties interact via a revenue-sharing contract. The general model is formulated as a Retailer-Stackelberg game with two-sided information asymmetry. We derive the equilibrium strategy and parties’ profits when: (i) information is complete, (ii) hidden information asymmetry is present, and (iii) known information asymmetry is present. For a third scenario, we propose two different contracts to induce a Pareto-optimal information-sharing equilibrium.
KeywordsRevenue sharing contract Asymmetric information Supply chain management
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