A Swing-Contract Market Design for Flexible Service Provision in Electric Power Systems

  • Wanning Li
  • Leigh TesfatsionEmail author
Part of the The IMA Volumes in Mathematics and its Applications book series (IMA, volume 162)


The need for flexible service provision in electric power systems has dramatically increased due to the growing penetration of variable energy resources, as has the need to ensure fair access and compensation for this provision. A swing contract facilitates flexible service provision with appropriate compensation because it permits multiple services to be offered together in bundled form with each service expressed as a range of possible values rather than as a single point value. This paper discusses a new swing-contract market design for electric power systems that permits swing contracts to be offered by any dispatchable resource. An analytical optimization formulation is developed for the clearing of a swing-contract day-ahead market that can be implemented using any standard mixed-integer linear programming solver. The practical feasibility of the optimization formulation is demonstrated by means of a numerical example.



This research has been supported in part by grants from the ISU Electric Power Research Center (EPRC), the Sandia National Laboratories (Contract No. 1163155), and the Department of Energy (DE-AR0000214 and DE-OE0000839). The authors are grateful to the editors and four reviewers for constructive comments and to Zhaoyu Wang and Shanshan Ma for helpful discussions related to the topic of this study.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Coover HallIowa State UniversityAmesUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics, Heady Hall 260Iowa State UniversityAmesUSA

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