“They Treated Me Like a Criminal”

Sanctions, Enforcement Characteristics, and Compliance
  • Joseph F. DiMento
Part of the Environment, Development, and Public Policy book series (EDPE)

Abstract

Efforts to achieve compliance with environmental law most often focus on a strong enforcement policy. As in many other areas of the criminal justice system, the almost unavoidable conclusion is that laws do not function smoothly because of a weak or nonexistent enforcement approach. Not enough violators are identified; when identified, not enough are sanctioned; and when they are sanctioned, penalties are insufficiently severe to communicate the fact that violations will not be tolerated.

Keywords

Wall Street Journal Business People Enforcement Policy Criminal Punishment Corporate Crime 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph F. DiMento
    • 1
  1. 1.University of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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