Voting Power in the European Central Bank

  • Matthias Brueckner
Chapter

Abstract

This paper investigates the power distribution in the actual and in an enlarged European Central Bank. By applying two different power indices (PI) it is shown that none of the voting rules described in the ECB statute yields a fair distribution of power. Moreover, it is demonstrated how the voting weights have to be reallocated in order to achieve a fair distribution of power. For that purpose a simple search algorithm is presented.

Keywords

European Union Monetary Policy Power Distribution Power Index European Central Bank 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthias Brueckner
    • 1
  1. 1.Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI)BonnGermany

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