Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation?

  • Manfred J. Holler
  • Guillermo Owen
Chapter

Abstract

This introductory note discusses the main arguments that motivate the growing interest in power indices and the theory of coalition formation that also determine the selection of contributions to this volume. The main arguments are those of substantial growth in the application of power indices to political institutions, especially the European Union, the intensive discussion of the monotonicity properties of various indices, and the probabilistic interpretation of power, coalition formation, and power measures.

Keywords

Power Index European Central Bank Median Voter Coalition Formation Winning Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manfred J. Holler
    • 1
  • Guillermo Owen
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsNaval Postgraduate SchoolMontereyUSA

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