Comments on “Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals”

  • Kenneth Lehn

Abstract

Larry Wall and Bob Eisenbeis provide a useful framework for thinking about the trade-offs involved in alternative regulatory structures. Specifically, they examine the relative merits of consolidating regulation in a single agency or dispersing it among multiple agencies. They also describe various institutional devices that mitigate against the disadvantages associated with each structure of regulation. The paper should be of great help to policy makers as they consider changes to the existing structure of financial regulation. Notwithstanding my favorable view of the paper, I do have a few suggestions.

Keywords

Financial Regulation Conflict Goal Favorable View Asset Sale Inconsistent Objective 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Hayek, Friedrich A. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35 (September 1945), 1–18.Google Scholar
  2. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. “Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8 (Summer 1995 ), 4–19.Google Scholar
  3. Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (October 1981), 841–864.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenneth Lehn
    • 1
  1. 1.University of PittsburghUSA

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