Probabilistic Interactions among Players of a Cooperative Game

  • Michel Grabisch
  • Marc Roubens
Chapter
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLB, volume 40)

Abstract

Let v N be a cooperative game on the finite set of players N that is a set function v called capacity from the power set P(N) to IR such that v(Ø) = O. v(S), for any coalition SN can be considered as the worth or power of the coalition of players being in the party S The set of all games defined on N is denoted g(N).

Keywords

Cooperative Game Equivalent Representation Marginal Contribution Maximal Chain Fuzzy Measure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Grabisch
    • 1
  • Marc Roubens
    • 2
  1. 1.Thomson-CSF Central Research LaboratoryOrsayFrance
  2. 2.University of LiègeBelgium

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