Rationalizability

  • Andrés Perea
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 29)

Abstract

In the concept of Nash equilibrium and its refinements, players are assumed to be informed about the opponents’ subjective probability distributions about the other players’ strategy choices. In this chapter we investigate the implications of dropping this assumption, while maintaining the assumption that players are informed about the opponents’ utility functions at the terminal nodes. The key concept in this chapter is rationalizability, as each of the other concepts discussed subsequently is based upon it.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Extensive Form Common Belief Strategy Choice Strategy Profile 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrés Perea
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of MaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Universidad Carlos III de MadridSpain

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