Central Banks and Supervision with an Application to the EMU

  • Xavier Vives
Chapter

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to discuss the optimal financial architecture arrangements between the central bank and other agencies with the aim of preserving the stability and soundness of the financial and banking system. The ideas developed are applied to assess the financial architecture framework of the European Monetary Union.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank European Central Bank Competition Policy Deposit Insurance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Vives
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Anàlisi EconòmicaCSICBarcelonaSpain

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