Oligopolistic Market Equilibrium

  • Anna Nagurney
Part of the Advances in Computational Economics book series (AICE, volume 10)

Abstract

Oligopolies are a fundamental economic market structure, with examples ranging from department stores and large firms in computer, automobile, chemical, or mineral extraction industries to small firms with local markets. Oligopoly theory dates to Cournot (1838), who investigated competition between two producers, the so-called duopoly problem, and is credited with being the first to study noncooperative behavior. In his treatise, the decisions made by the producers are said to be in equilibrium if no one can increase his/her income by unilateral action, given that the other producer does not alter his/her decision.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Variational Inequality Network Equilibrium Supply Market Oligopoly Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anna Nagurney
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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