Transmission Networks and Market Power

  • Ziad Younes
  • Marija Ilic
Chapter
Part of the The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science book series (PEPS)

Abstract

Combined cycle technologies and other electric power generation technologies have reduced the economies of and the critical size of a single generation unit, enabling the multiplication of generators and reducing their individual market power. This phenomenon is expected to facilitate the emergence of a competitive generation market and is one of the major arguments in favor of deregulating the electric power industry. Without transmission constraints and losses, the market for generation would have a unique equilibrium price and the features of a classical perfect or oligopolistic market, and a reduction in the critical size of a generator should definitely improve the competitiveness of the market. Nevertheless, because of loop flows, transmission constraints, and other network externalities, the electric power market is unique and must be studied carefully.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Market Power Transmission Network Relevant Market Loop Flow 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ziad Younes
    • 1
  • Marija Ilic
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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