The New Financial Landscape and its Impact on Corporate Governance

  • Hans J. Blommestein
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 33)

Abstract

Corporate governance structures are essential for shaping enterprise behavior, including the response by enterprises to these pressures and the associated new investment and growth opportunities. Improving the understanding of corporate governance is therefore of utmost importance. Enhanced understanding will permit the identification of policy priorities and tradeoffs as regards the regulatory and institutional environment which conditions corporate governance structures.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Capital Market Mutual Fund Institutional Investor Pension Fund 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans J. Blommestein

There are no affiliations available

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