Right to Services

  • Bruce Dennis Sales
  • D. Matthew Powell
  • Richard Van Duizend

Abstract

No area of law which affects developmentally disabled people has engendered so many controversies as the right to receive services and the procedures by which these services are provided. Debates over segregation, deinstitutionalization, commitment, consent, the right to refuse treatment, the doctrine of least restrictive alternatives, and parental rights have raged in recent years. These same issues have found their way into both courts and legislatures. Almost none can be said to have been resolved definitively.

Keywords

Supra Note Program Plan Disable People Disable Person Respite Care 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §88–2504(f) (Supp. 1979) (the client requires direct medical services and needs 24-hour training in a residential care facilitiy); WYO. STAT. §9–6–621 (d) (1977) (the client is a fit subject for care and training).Google Scholar
  84. 80.
    E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§88–2503.21, 88–2504(f) (1979, Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §43–1–13 (Repl. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5123.76(E) (Page Supp. 1979).Google Scholar
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    E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91-½, §§4–609(b), 4–612 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§27B-7–16, 27B-8–10 (1976).Google Scholar
  86. 82.
    Those which, although granting the right to an attorney, do not require one include: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §330.1454(3) (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §41–21-73 (Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5123.76(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1979).Google Scholar
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    ALA. CODE tit. 22, §52–55(b) (1975).Google Scholar
  88. 84.
    E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §88–2502(p) (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE §66–329(h) (Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. §9–6–621 (c) (1977).Google Scholar
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    E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §253A.07(12) (West 1971); S.C. CODE §44–21-90 (1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547–300, §37(m)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).Google Scholar
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    E.g., IDAHO CODE §66–329(h) (Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §330.1517(3)(d)-(g) (1975); WYO. STAT. §9–6–621(c) (1977).Google Scholar
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    E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §333–27 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §43–1–13(D) (Repl. 1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547–300, §37(p) (Vernon Supp. 1980).Google Scholar
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    E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §433.494(2) (1975) (every three months), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §330.1531(1) (1975) (every six months), TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547–300, §17(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (annually).Google Scholar
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    E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-½, §4–612 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (the client or anyone on his behalf); N.M. STAT. ANN. §43–1–13(G) (Repl. 1979) (the client, legal guardian, parent, spouse, relative, or friend).Google Scholar
  99. 95.
    E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 22, §52–57 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §330.1531(1) (1975); W. VA. CODE §27–5–8(a) (Supp. 1978).Google Scholar
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    E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §43–1–13(G) (Repl. 1979).Google Scholar
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    E.g, W. VA. CODE §27–5–8(b) (Supp. 1978).Google Scholar
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    OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5123.76(H) (Page Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.320 (Supp. 1978).Google Scholar
  103. 99.
    E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§83–218, 83–387 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §64–8–8(10) (1977).Google Scholar
  104. 100.
    E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §222.42 (West Supp. 1979–80) (client or any “reputable person”).Google Scholar
  105. 101.
    E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-½, §4–706(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).Google Scholar
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    TEX. REV. CIV. STAT ANN. art. 5547–300, §§39 & 40 (Vernon Supp. 1980).Google Scholar
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    IOWA CODE ANN. §222.43(2) (West Supp. 1979–80).Google Scholar
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    MINN. STAT. ANN. §253A.19(1) (West 1971).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Dennis Sales
    • 1
  • D. Matthew Powell
    • 1
  • Richard Van Duizend
    • 1
  1. 1.Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project of the American Bar Association’sCommission on the Mentally DisabledUSA

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