Energy Pricing and Taxation

  • Subhes C. BhattacharyyaEmail author


This chapter introduces the economic concepts related to pricing of energy in different market conditions. The chapter starts with the basic competitive market model and discusses the extensions required to analyse specific features (such as indivisibility of capital, specificity of assets, capital intensiveness, etc.) of the energy sector. The chapter also covers the issue of market failure and presents the commonly used market interventions in such situations. The concept of cost-benefit analysis is used as the framework for most of the analysis. The principles of energy pricing are then introduced and the economic rationale behind energy taxation is considered.


Competitive market model Market failures Government intervention Energy taxation Energy pricing 

Supplementary material


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© Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Energy and Sustainable DevelopmentDe Montfort UniversityLeicesterUK

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