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Lessons from Major Accidents

  • Jan-Erik VinnemEmail author
  • Willy Røed
Chapter
Part of the Springer Series in Reliability Engineering book series (RELIABILITY)

Abstract

An overview of some important accidents and near-misses are presented from worldwide operations. The focus is on the accident sequence, the possible failures of barrier functions, as well as lessons to be learned for design and operation. Blowouts, process fires and explosions, riser and pipeline failures as well as structural and marine systems failures are covered. At the end there is an overview of barrier function performance in all accidents and incidents.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EngineeringNorwegian University of Science and TechnologyTrondheimNorway
  2. 2.Faculty of Science and TechnologyUniversity of StavangerStavangerNorway

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