Summary
We consider a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty, only for the first mover. We study the advantages of leadership and flexibility with the variation of the demand uncertainty. Liu proved for demand uncertainty parameter greater than three that the follower firm can have an advantage with respect to the leading firm for some realizations of the demand intercept. Here, we prove that for demand uncertainty parameter less than three the leading firm is always in advantage.
Keywords
Marginal Cost Demand Uncertainty Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Rand Journal Stackelberg Leadership
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