NATO Enlargement: Who Gains? Who Loses?
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrates its fiftieth anniversary, NATO enlargement continues to be a divisive analytical issue. This paper seeks to promote discussion as to who gains, and who loses, from the NATO enlargement process. To assess the implications of NATO enlargement, I look at four specific cases: the United States, Western Europe, the three new members, and Russia. My central conclusion is that each of the four groups emerged with real or perceived gains from NATO enlargement. However, the gains may not be what was initially expected and the long-term implications for NATO and the future of European security are cause for serious concern.
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- 3.For further discussion, see Michael E. Brown, et al (eds.), America’s Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), especially chapters by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, and Michael Mastanduno. Also see comments on internal containment of Germany by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Andrej Sylinski, ‘Brzezinski: Enlarged NATO Contains Germany’s Power in Europe.’ Associated Press, 7 December 1997.Google Scholar
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