Advertisement

Explaining NATO’s Non-Policy on Out-Of-Area Issues During the Cold War

  • Frode Liland
Chapter

Abstract

In 1995, NATO ground forces were sent to Bosnia on their first out-of-area mission. Four years later, NATO went to war with Yugoslavia in an attempt to solve the impasse regarding the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in one of its provinces, Kosovo. Within a few years, then, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had completely thrown overboard its out-of-area policy from the Cold War: that of not having one. To put this new active NATO role in perspective, this article attempts to explain why NATO ended up with a non-policy on out-of-area issues during the Cold War.1

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    For overviews over NATO and out-of-area issues during the Cold War, see F. Liland, Keeping NATO Out of Trouble: NATO’s Non-Policy on Out-of-Area Issues During the Cold War (Oslo: Forsvarsstudier no. 4, 1999); E.D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); D. Stuart and W. Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of Area Problems Since 1949 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).Google Scholar
  2. 4.
    M.P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 366.Google Scholar
  3. 6.
    L.S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, updated edn. (New York: Twayne, 1994), pp. 41–49.Google Scholar
  4. 7.
    Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); D. Stuart and W. Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of Area Problems Since 1949 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    M.P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 366.Google Scholar
  6. 7.
    W. Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 239.Google Scholar
  7. 8.
    D. Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 484.Google Scholar
  8. 9.
    R.H. Immerman: ‘Prologue: Perceptions by the United States of Its Interests in Indochina’, in L.S. Kaplan, D. Artaud and M.R. Rubin (eds.): Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1945–1955 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1990), pp. 1–28. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 380–83.Google Scholar
  9. 23.
    H. Haraldstad, Norsk nei til Franco i NATO (Oslo: Forsvarsstudier no. 4, 1995).Google Scholar
  10. 24.
    J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 210–213, 135.Google Scholar
  11. 29.
    J. Garrat: ‘Euro-American Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1970– 80: The Pervasive Crisis’, in S.L. Spiegel (ed.): The Middle East and the Western Alliance (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) (pp. 82–103), p. 84. R.L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 427, 450–51. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 138–44. Stuart/Tow, The Limits of Alliance, pp. 80–82.Google Scholar
  12. 31.
    H.M. Synstnes, Siste avgang til Cuba: Lagnaden til norsk skipsfart pÕ Cuba, 1962–1964 (University of Oslo: MA-thesis in History, 1996), ch. 2–6.Google Scholar
  13. 44.
    H.W. Brands, Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945–1993 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp. 192–96. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 167–70. Stuart/Tow, The Limits of Alliance, pp. 242– 43.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frode Liland

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations