Equity, Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game
Traditionally, game theory does not pay much attention to the meaning of players’ payoffs, apart from considering that they represent numerically a given system of preferences. This fact is in agreement with a theory of rationality that allows any behaviour to be considered rational at the moment it is preferred to any other possible behaviour. But the reasons for preferences can be very important if they are closely related to the understanding of observed coordination between players.
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