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Russo-Chinese Detente and the Emerging New World Order

  • Richard C. Thornton

Abstract

As the new world order emerges from the Cold War, Russia’s detente with China is one of the least remarked of a number of important developments of the past decade, yet it is arguably one of the most important. It is the thesis of this chapter that in the context of major change in American strategy, Russo-Chinese cooperation could be the engine of positive fundamental, structural change in Eurasia, but Russo-Chinese competition could, on the other hand, lead to the renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula.

Keywords

Korean Peninsula World Order Soviet Economy Soviet Leadership Offensive Weapon 
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Notes

  1. 3.
    Peter Schweizer, Victory, The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 6 et passim.Russo-Chinese Detente and the Emerging New World Order 237Google Scholar
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  3. 8.
    For an elucidation of this crucial point, see Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990), especially the chapters by Anders Aslund and Daniel Epstein.Google Scholar
  4. 13.
    For a revealing account of this shift, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1993), especially Chapter 41, ‘Breaking Through to the Soviets,’ pp. 879–900.Google Scholar
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    Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1992).Google Scholar
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    A senior Chinese official, Chen Yizi, who defected to the West after the Tienanmen incident, has confirmed the occurrence of this debate. See Jim Hoagland, ‘Senior Chinese Official Who Fled Emerges From Hiding,’ The Washington Post, September 4, 1989, p. Al.Google Scholar
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    For a useful discussion of Chinese relations with North Korea, see Yong-Sup Han, ‘China’s Leverage Over North Korea,’ Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1994, pp. 233–49.Google Scholar
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    For a concise analysis of North Korea, see Yossef Bodansky, Crisis In Korea - The Emergence of a New and Dangerous Nuclear Power (New York: SPI Books, 1994).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Hafeez Malik 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard C. Thornton

There are no affiliations available

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