Hierarchic autoepistemic theories for nonmonotonic reasoning: Preliminary report

  • Kurt Konolige
Autoepistemic Logics
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 346)


Nonmonotonic logics are meant to be a formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning. However, for the most part they fail to embody two of the most important aspects of such reasoning: the explicit computational nature of nonmonotonic inference, and the assignment of preferences among competing inferences. We propose a method of nonmonotonic reasoning in which the notion of inference from specific bodies of evidence plays a fundamental role. The formalization is based on autoepistemic logic, but introduces additional structure, a hierarchy of evidential spaces. The method offers a natural formalization of many different applications of nonmonotonic reasoning, including reasoning about action, speech acts, belief revision, and various situations involving competing defaults.


Belief Revision Default Rule Default Logic Nonmonotonic Reasoning Default Reasoning 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kurt Konolige
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for the Study of Language and InformationArtificial Intelligence CenterMenlo Park

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