What Is at Stake in the Controversy over Conditionals

  • Ernest W. Adams
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3301)


The following remarks are going to suggest that there is more at stake in the current controversy over conditionals than merely the logic of conditionals. Among the more general issues involved are the limits of truth-conditionality, the implications of this for certain programs in the philosophy of language, the values of truth and probability, and the rationale of logic [and, incidentally, the foundations of probability and decision theory as well, but I won’t get into that].


Conditional Probability Logical Consequence Logical Truth Logical Principle Material Conditional 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ernest W. Adams
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaBerkeley

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