Targeting in the Presence of Redistributive Costs

Part of the Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being book series (EIAP, volume 2)


The lump-sum targeting schemes analyzed in Chapter 12 assumed that there exist characteristics on which governments can condition benefit transfers. For instance, we modelled the impact on poverty of giving $1 to everyone that belonged to some socio-demographic group k. These transfers were not decreasing with levels of income since we implicitly assumed that income levels were not directly observable. The tools derived in Chapter 12 enabled us, however, to identify on which observable socioeconomic characteristics we should condition transfers to reduce poverty fastest.


Opportunity Cost Poverty Line Poverty Index Income Support State Expenditure 
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