Advertisement

Incentives, Inequality and the Allocation of Aid When Conditionality Doesn’t Work: An Optimal Nonlinear Taxation Approach

  • Ravi Kanbur
  • Matti Tuomala
Part of the Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being book series (EIAP, volume 1)

Keywords

Social Welfare Function Recipient Country Inequality Aversion Incentive Compatibility Constraint Recipient Government 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aitchison, J. & Brown, J.A.C. (1957): The lognormal distribution with special reference to its uses in economics, Cambridge University Press, 1957.Google Scholar
  2. Berg, E. (2000): “Aid and Failed Reforms: The Case of Public Sector Management,” in Finn Tarp (ed.).Google Scholar
  3. Boone, P. (1996): “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” European Economic Review.Google Scholar
  4. Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (2000): “Aid, Policies and Growth,” American Economic Review.Google Scholar
  5. Devarajan, S., D. Dollar and T. Holmgren, eds. (2001), Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies, World Bank, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
  6. Immonen, R. Kanbur, R., Keen, M. and Tuomala, M. (1998): Tagging and taxing: The optimal use of categorical and income information indesigning tax/transfer schemes, Economica 65, 179–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Kanbur, R., T. Sandler and K. Morrison (1999): The Future of Development Assistance, Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Kanbur, R. & Tuomala, M.: Inherent inequality and the optimal graduation of marginal tax rates, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96(2), 275–282, 1994.Google Scholar
  9. Kanbur, R. (2000): “Aid Conditionality and Debt in Africa,” in Finn Tarp (ed.)Google Scholar
  10. Killick, T. (1995): “Conditionality and the Adjustment-Development Connection,” Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, 11(1–2), 17–36.Google Scholar
  11. Mirrlees, J.A.: An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation, Review of Economic Studies 38, 175–208, 1971.zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  12. Mirrlees, J.A (1976): Optimal tax theory: A synthesis, Journal of Public Economics 6, 327–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Mosley, P., J. Harrigan and J. Toye (1995): Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, Vol. 1–2, London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  14. Svensson, J. (2000a): “When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 61(1): 61–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Svensson (2000b): “Why Conditional Aid Doesn’t Work and What Can be Done About it? Reforming Donor Institutions,” Processed, Stockholm: Institute of International Economic Studies.Google Scholar
  16. Tarp, F. (ed.) (2000): Foreign Aid and Development, London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  17. Thorbecke, E. (2000): “The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid,” in Finn Tarp (ed.).Google Scholar
  18. Tuomala, M.: Optimal income tax and redistribution, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990Google Scholar
  19. World Bank (1998): Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  20. World Bank (1992): World Bank Structural and Sectoral Adjustment Operations: The Second OED Review, Operations Evaluation Department Report 10870, Washington, D.C: World Bank.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ravi Kanbur
    • 1
  • Matti Tuomala
    • 2
  1. 1.Cornell UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of TampereTampere

Personalised recommendations