Skip to main content

Power and Domination in the Chinese Garment Workplace

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Chinese Migrant Workers and Employer Domination

Part of the book series: Series in Asian Labor and Welfare Policies ((Series in Asian Labor and Welfare Policies))

  • 201 Accesses

Abstract

In this chapter, I turn to the modes of domination inside a Chinese garment factory, focusing on factory management’s changing workplace strategies. An increasingly heterogeneous garment workforce containing more and more young male workers drove changes in management strategies. I show that management uses an array of new mechanisms to control various aspects of workers’ labor power. It becomes clear by the end of my inquiry of workplace domination that Chinese management is resorting to softer, personalized, and non-coercive workplace strategies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The following quote succinctly captures what Marx highlights as the problem of instability of a heterogeneous workforce under the capitalist mode of production: “[L]arge-scale industry, by its very nature, necessitates variation of labor, fluidity of functions, and mobility of the workers in all directions. But on the other hand, in its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labor with its ossified particularities. We have seen how this absolute contradiction does away with all repose, all fixity and all security as far as the worker’s life situation is concerned. … But if, at present, variation of labor imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with obstacles everywhere, large scale industry, through its very catastrophes, makes the recognition of variation of labor and hence of the fitness of the worker for the maximum number of different kinds of labor into a question of life and death” (Marx, 1976, pp. 617–618). See also, Harvey (2000, pp. 103–105).

  2. 2.

    This paradox has been long addressed in the literature of organization theory and “the conflict” perspective in sociological theory continues to be controversial. For example, William Baldamus (1961) asked the same question in his Efficiency and Effort when he criticized the underlying harmonious assumptions in “consensus theory.” Baldamus asked, “Once the assumption of a harmonious and self-regulating system is removed, we are faced with the vastly complicated jungle of industrial administration that would seem to be without any system at all. If conflict is basic and unavoidable, how do we account for the apparent stability of employer-employee relations when there are no strikes, no grievances, no dissatisfactions?” [my emphasis] (p. 1).

  3. 3.

    “The form of co-operation which is based on division of labor assumes its classical shape in manufacture. As a characteristic form of the capitalist process of production it prevails throughout the manufacturing period” (Marx, 1976, p. 455).

  4. 4.

    It should be noted that earlier studies such as Lee (1998, pp. 116–117) and Pun (2005, pp. 145–150) were launched in middle-sized factories. Different sizes of factories as I discussed in Chapter 4 have different workforce composition in terms of age and gender. Large-sized factories have a more elaborate and complicated organizational structure with more ranks, grades, and departments than the middle- and small-sized factories. However, if we only focus on the commanding structure along a production line, usually different sizes of factories resemble each other.

  5. 5.

    “Men were not totally excluded from the assembly lines, but over 90 of the positions were occupied by women” (Pun, 2005, pp. 149). In Ching Kwan Lee’s ethnography, a higher proportion of male workforce was noted. But still it was only about 20 of total employees. See Lee (1998, p. 116).

  6. 6.

    “Manufacture therefore develops a hierarchy of labor powers, to which there corresponds a scale of wages,” “Alongside the gradations of the hierarchy, there appears the simple separation of the workers into skilled and unskilled” (Marx, 1976, pp. 469–470).

  7. 7.

    As Chris and Charles Tilly rightly point out, employers are constrained by bounded rationality and multiple objectives when they run their business and try their best to optimize. More importantly, these multiple objectives are sometimes conflictual in nature. The aspects that management seek to control presented in this section also represent the conflictual nature of these multiple objectives (e.g., quality vs. efficiency; productivity vs. organizational maintenance; cost minimization vs. flexibility). See Tilly and Tilly (1998, pp. 107–111).

  8. 8.

    For power, I adopt Max Weber’s (1997) definition: power is “the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” On the other hand, authority may be defined as the “probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons… The important difference between power and authority consists in the fact that whereas power is essentially tied to the personality of individuals, authority is always associated with social positions or roles … authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection. In this sense, authority can be described as legitimate power” (Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 166). However, I avoid using the term “authority.” As Andrew Walder (1986) said, “All forms of authority, according to Weber, involve specific normative and ideological claims made by superiors, ‘ideal’ and material interests in obedience, and a characteristic form of conflict shaped by the pattern of authority” (pp. 23–24). As I demonstrate in this chapter, workers’ subjection to workplace control is not just an imposition of “specific normative and ideological claims” made unilaterally by superiors. Maybe it is true in the Maoist period Chinese factory institutions in which structural and ideological power were persuasive. But it is not the case I found in the post-socialist Chinese workplaces. For ideology, I adopt Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) definition. Ideology, as cement for social relations, which binds individuals to one another, and connects one’s immediate experiences to each other, to the past, and to the future, is a “creation of concrete phantasy which acts on the dispersed and shattered people arouse and organize its collective will” (p. 126).

  9. 9.

    These affective personal ties are not ideology. Recall that Gramsci’s definition of ideology is that ideology is the “creation of concrete phantasy which acts on the dispersed and shattered people arouse and organize its collective will.” First of all, these personal ties are concrete social relations, not “phantasy.” Second, there is no “collective will” articulated. Instead, exactly the opposite, exchanges between management and workers through these interpersonal relations aim to individualize and de-collectivize class relations.

  10. 10.

    This form of hidden collective bargaining and “slowing down” resembles the “hidden transcripts” (e.g., foot-dragging) portrayed by James C. Scott (1990) vis-à-vis the significance of everyday life resistance and infrapolitics, albeit Scott’s study focuses on how peasants in Malaysia discredited the powerful in a village setting, while the context of my study is inside a factory (pp. 183–201). Certainly, this hidden form of collective bargaining at Pearl is a form of what Scott (1985) elsewhere refers to as “weapons of the weak.”

  11. 11.

    Both Ching Kwan Lee (1998) and Ngai Pun (2005) have described the use of hometown networks to recruit and control Chinese migrant workers in Shenzhen during the 1990s. Lee (1998) conceptualized this labor regime in Shenzhen as “localistic despotism.”

  12. 12.

    The new context indicates that workers’ marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power have increased since 2010. On the broader topic in comparative perspective, see Silver (2003, p. 13).

References

  • ACFTU. (2010, giugno 21). Guanyu xinshengdai nongmingong wenti de yanjiu baogao (Rapporto di ricerca sulla questione dei lavoratori migranti di nuova generazione). Gongren Ribao. Accessed through http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/21/c_12240721.htm. Last accessed 18 November 2012.

  • Baldamus, W. (1961). Efficiency and effort. London: Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cai, Y. (2010). Collective resistance in China: Why popular protests succeed or fail. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chan, A. (2001). China’s workers under assault: The exploitation of labor in a globalizing economy. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chan, C. K. C. (2010). The challenge of labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour regime in global factories. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, C. K. C., & Hui, E. S. I. (2012). The dynamics and dilemma of workplace trade union reform in China: The case of the Honda workers’ strike. Journal of Industrial Relations, 54(5), 653–668.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, C. K. C., & Hui, E. S. I. (2014). The development of collective bargaining in China: From “collective bargaining by riot” to “party state-led wage bargaining”. The China Quarterly, 217, 221–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Child, J. (1984). Organization: A guide to problems and practice. London: Sage.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and class conflict in industrial society. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Delbridge, R., & Ezzamel, M. (2005). The strength of difference: Contemporary conceptions of control. Organization, 15(2), 603–618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Delbridge, R., Fleming, P., & Sturdy, A. (2010). Normative control and beyond in contemporary capitalism. In C. Smith & P. Thompson (Eds.), Working life: Renewing labour process analysis (pp. 113–135). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, P. (1986). Conflict at work. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, P., & Scullion, H. (1982). The social organization of industrial conflict. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, E. (2014). Insurgency trap: Labor politics in postsocialist China. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, M., Giles, J., Park, A., & Wang, M. (2015). China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and implications for China’s workers. Human Relations, 68(2), 197–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goffman, E. (1955). On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction. Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, 18(3), 213–231.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays in face-to-face behavior. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartley, B., & Thompson, P. (2007). HRM and the worker: Labor process perspectives. In P. F. Boxall, J. Purcell, & P. M. Wright (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of human resource management (pp. 147–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of hope. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kramar, R. (1987). Affirmative action: A challenge to Australian employers and trade unions. Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(2), 169–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee, C. K. (1998). Gender and the South China miracle: Two worlds of factory women. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leung, P. (2015). Labor activists and the new working class in China: Strike leaders’ struggles. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marx, K. (1976). Capital: A critique of political economy (Vol. 1, B. Fowkes, Trans.). London: Penguin in association with New Left Review.

    Google Scholar 

  • Otis, E. M. (2012). Markets and bodies: Women, service work, and the making of inequality in China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pun, N. (2005). Made in China: Women factory workers in a global workplace. Durham, NC, London, and Hong Kong: Duke University Press and Hong Kong University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (1952). Structure and function in primitive society. London: Cohen & West.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reed, M. (2010). Control in contemporary work organizations. In P. Blyton, E. Heery, & P. Turnbull (Eds.), Reassessing the employment relationship. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sewell, G. (1998). The discipline of teams: The control of team-based industrial work through electronic and peer surveillance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2), 397–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of labor: Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tilly, C., & Tilly, C. (1998). Work under capitalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, M. (1997). The theory of social and economic organization (A. M. Henderson, Trans., T. Parsons, Ed.). Glencoe: The Free Press (Original work published 1947).

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, B. (1983). The shopfloor politics of new technology. London: Heinemann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, C. (1992). Beyond industrial sociology: The work of men and women. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kaxton Siu .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Siu, K. (2020). Power and Domination in the Chinese Garment Workplace. In: Chinese Migrant Workers and Employer Domination. Series in Asian Labor and Welfare Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9123-2_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9123-2_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-32-9122-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-32-9123-2

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics