Abstract
Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ. Sci. Budapest, 39(1996), 175–179) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly games. If for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be convex. Analogously, if for another specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then revenue functions of the firms must be concave in their respective variables.
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Research was done in the framework of Grant NKFI K-1 119930.
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Forgó, F., Kánnai, Z. (2020). Necessary Conditions for Concave and Cournot Oligopoly Games. In: Szidarovszky, F., Bischi, G. (eds) Games and Dynamics in Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3623-6_10
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