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The Financing of the Belt and Road Initiative: Blessings and Curses

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The Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

One of the main cornerstones of all programmes of infrastructures lies always on its financing. This is also the case of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative is estimated to be supported by around USD one trillion in financing from Chinese state-owned banks, close to ten times at current prices the amount made available by the United States for the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War under the so-called Marshall Plan. Understanding the sources and the tools available for the financing of the initiative is critical to fully grasp BRI’s dimension and its expected impact in promoting economic development, connectivity and trade in Asia. This financing should be also observed and assessed in the context of the competition, but also the synergies, of the financing supplied by multilateral institutions like the World Bank Group or the Asian Development Bank. Finally, we will address the incipient negative externalities of the sources and tools of financing used in the context of the initiative that are starting to be felt in borrowing members, especially in relatively highly indebted countries. We argue that most of the risks identified are less severe than some critics suggest and that these risks are being relatively mitigated. Finally, we make some policy recommendations that could mitigate even further the identified risks.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Xinhua (2017a) also mentions other transcontinental rail routes that have recently been inaugurated between China and Europe, namely between (i) Chongqing and Duisburg, in Germany; (ii) Chengu and Poland; and (iii) Yiwu and Madrid, in Spain.

  2. 2.

    The CPEC, estimated at a total of USD 60 billion, was described as the ‘fastest and most effective’ of all the BRI projects by the Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad (Voice of America News 2017).

  3. 3.

    See the official BRI portal (https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10076&cur_page=1) for a list of countries with Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed for collaboration with China under the BRI.

  4. 4.

    Measured in current US dollars.

  5. 5.

    90% of Ethiopian trade went through Djibouti in 2016 according to Word Bank (2017).

  6. 6.

    Zhang and Miller (2017) refer to 47 firms, such as State Grid, China Railway Group, China Energy Engineering or China Communications Construction Group (CCCG), out of a universe of 102 STOEs participating in around than 1,676 BRI projects. The authors also refer, as examples, that (i) CCCG alone had notched up USD 40 billion of contracts and built 10,320 km of road, 95 deep water ports, 10 airports, 152 bridges and 2,080 railways in Belt and Road countries, or (ii) the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had participated in 212 BRI projects by providing USD 67.4 billion in total.

  7. 7.

    Johnston (2017).

  8. 8.

    China Development Bank (2018).

  9. 9.

    Together with the progress of China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS); the deepening of Hong Kong as facilitator of renminbi’s internationalization; the progressive opening of financial markets to foreign investment after the 2007–08 crisis; and the increasing presence of FinTech online payment systems, such as Alipay and WeChat Pay.

  10. 10.

    Together with: quickening the building of the CIPS; extending the renminbi foreign exchange swap to local credit system; creating a renminbi-transaction network in those key industrial parks overseas where Chinese firms are congregated; and, particularly related to project financing, encouraging Chinese financial institutions to issue renminbi-denominated loans with preferential interest rates’.

  11. 11.

    China’s sovereign credit rating is A+ according to Standard & Poor’s and Fitch and A1 according to Moody’s.

  12. 12.

    Let’s take the examples of the Jakarta-Bandung Railway, Indonesia’s first high-speed railway; the Lao PDR section of the Kunming-Singapore railway; and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. First, in Indonesia, the China Development Bank offered a 40-year concessionary loan, without asking for government debt guarantees, to finance 75% of the USD 5.3 billion railway. The loans carried a 10-year grace period. A 60% portion was denominated in US dollars carrying a 2% interest rate, and the remaining 40% calculated in Chinese yuan, carrying a 3.4% rate. Second, in Lao PDR, the Export–Import Bank of China offered a concessionary loan with an interest rate set slightly below 3%. Finally, in Sri Lanka, for phase I of the port, the Export–Import Bank of China offered an 11-year commercial loan to finance USD 306 million at 6.3% with a one-year grace period (see Sirimanna [2011] and Zhang and Miller [2017], for further details and examples).

  13. 13.

    Namely, Djibouti; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Maldives; Mongolia; Montenegro; Pakistan; and Tajikistan.

  14. 14.

    The Laotian government, in an attempt to control the impact of the project in its public finances, has limited their participation to around USD 700 million and financed the remaining amount through a public–private partnership. Nonetheless, USD 500 million of the Laotian contribution will be financed through a loan of the Export–Import Bank of China.

  15. 15.

    Namely ADB, AIIB, EIB, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), NDB and World Bank Group.

  16. 16.

    Argentina, Belarus, Cambodia, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Greece, Hungry, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Serbia, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

  17. 17.

    Potential is vast, in that pension funds alone, which held USD 7.8 trillion in assets in 2016, are estimated to invest only about 1% of funds under management in infrastructure (ADB 2017).

  18. 18.

    Interestingly, the document also enumerates the priority sectors were financing should be channeled, namely: (a) infrastructure connectivity; (b) trade and investment; (c) industrial capacity cooperation; (d) energy and energy efficiency; (e) natural resources; and (f) small and medium enterprises.

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Correspondence to Enrique Martínez-Galán .

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this text are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asian Development Bank.

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Martínez-Galán, E. (2020). The Financing of the Belt and Road Initiative: Blessings and Curses. In: Leandro, F., Duarte, P. (eds) The Belt and Road Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_6

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