Abstract
The side-channel attacks (SCAs) use the correlation between the power leakage information and the key to implement the attack process. The result of SCAs has a certain probability. If guessing an 8-bit key, there is a probability of 1/256 that the key will be guessed coincidentally, resulting in false positive. Therefore, the reliability of result key also needs an index to measure. Thereby, this paper proposes a novel evaluation index based on confidence value (CV). The CV of result key is divided three levels, low false positive, medium false positive and high false positive. CV provides a new reference index for the designers, suppliers and users of cryptographic devices to evaluate the security of devices.
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The project is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant (61702172, 61672217, 61832018) and the National Key Research and Development Plan of China under Grant 2016YFB0200405.
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Cai, X., Kuang, S., Shen, G., Li, R., Li, S., Hu, X. (2019). Confidence Value: A Novel Evaluation Index of Side-Channel Attack. In: Xu, W., Xiao, L., Li, J., Zhu, Z. (eds) Computer Engineering and Technology. NCCET 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1146. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1850-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1850-8_1
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