Abstract
The paper gives a synoptic view of the evolution of macroeconomic policies from the time of the Great Depression and the current thinking in stabilizing business cycles and financial markets, and makes an overview of the policy response to the recent Global Financial Crisis. It analyses the adjustments made in the global economy in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, as also the adjustments in financial markets. The concluding section discusses the current prospects of the global economy, and the risks that possibly lie ahead.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of the IMF, and Lawrence Summers, president of Barrack Obama’s National Economic Council, when the financial crisis broke, are in “no doubt that, absent the strong monetary and fiscal policy responses we have observed, the financial crisis would have led to an outcome as bad or worse than the Great Depression”. See Blanchard and Summers (2017).
- 2.
The most articulate proponent of this view was of course Friedman (1963) according to whom “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”
- 3.
The Taylor Rule formula interest rate = 0.5 (current GDP − potential GDP) + 0.5 (Actual consumer price inflation − target core consumer price inflation) + 2. The constant, 2, in the equation is the neutral policy rate, i.e., the policy rate when both inflation and growth are on target.
- 4.
This decline has been attributed to technological change, productivity improvements, globalization and ageing. See Sanchez and Kim (2018).
- 5.
Bernanke (2003) was critical of Japanese QE because according to him it was not aggressive enough.
- 6.
Kuttner and Posen (2002) have argued that despite the sharp increase in nominal deficits, when the revenue shock is factored in, Japanese fiscal policy was actually contractionary in the nineties.
- 7.
The fourth instrument was the ‘forward guidance’ on Fed policy that affected market participants’ behavior. See Bernanke et al. (2004).
- 8.
The Feds Fund Rate (FFR) is the rate at which depositary institutions trade balances they hold at the Federal Reserve, and is set by the Federal Reserve. (LIBOR type benchmarks, on the other hand, are rates at which banks borrow from each other in the interbank market, and are market determined). The discount rate is the liquidity window at which depositary institutions can borrow from the Federal Reserve as a ‘last resort’, and is therefore usually set at a small spread above the FFR. The reserves held by depositary institutions with the Federal Reserve were interest free till the global financial crisis. It was constrained to pay interest on them in view of their growing size, as risk averse banks preferred to park their funds with the Federal Reserve as a result of risk aversion (Chart 9a). Large, sudden withdrawals can put downward pressure on the benchmark FFR.
- 9.
Data on cyclical fiscal balances is from IMF’s Fiscal Monitor database. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/FM.
- 10.
- 11.
In his Nobel Prize lecture delivered over three decades ago the economist Lewis (1979) observed that economic growth in developing countries was dependent on economic prospects in OECD countries that accounted for the major share of global demand.
- 12.
The experience with fiscal policy during both the Japanese financial crisis of the nineties, and the more recent Global Financial Crisis has reopened the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and fiscal multipliers, in a liquidity trap. The role of fiscal policy in the recovery from the Great Depression before the “second dip” remains contentious. Till recently, following Milton Friedman, the focus was more on monetary policy driving the recovery. See Brown (1956). Romer (1993) concluded that it was mainly monetary policy that drove the recovery. Eggertson (2005, 2010) and have underscored the role played by fiscal policy in the recovery. See also De Long and Summers (2012). More recently Romer (2011) has argued that but for the fiscal stimulus the fall in consumption during the Global Financial Crisis would have been higher.
- 13.
The G20 resolve was mindful of the disastrous snowballing impact of the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs that aggravated the Great Depression in the 1930s (Sheel 2014, pp. 270–71).
- 14.
- 15.
The US and Euro area data is from the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank. The Japanese and Chinese data is from the FSB.
- 16.
Mortgage based securities are issued by pooling mortgage receivables, while asset backed securities are issued by pooling of receivables from non-mortgage assets, such as credit cards, student loans, auto loans and home equity loans.
- 17.
According to the Financial Stability Board (2017), those “ aspects of shadow banking considered to have contributed to the global financial crisis have declined significantly and generally no longer pose financial stability risks”.
- 18.
While US Mortgage Related Securities have not shrunk since the crisis, in 2006 and 2007, on the eve of the financial crisis, almost two thirds of mortgage related securities outstanding were issued by private companies. This declined sharply in the wake of the financial crisis, and in 2018 about 85% of all such instruments were guaranteed by Government Sponsored Enterprises, namely Freddie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae (SIFMA op. cit).
- 19.
Assets of ‘other financial intermediaries’, the FSB’s broad measure of shadow banking.
- 20.
This corresponds to FSB’s Monitoring Universe of Non-Financial Institutions, or MUNFI (Bank of International Settlements 2018).
- 21.
Or Economic Function 1, one of the five narrow measures of shadow banking of the Financial Stability Board. This narrow measure aggregated 13% of global financial assets globally at the end of 2016. Of this over 70% constituted collective investment vehicles such as Money Mutual Funds, real estate funds, credit hedge funds, mixed funds etc. that are susceptible to runs. Financial Stability Board (2019).
- 22.
The central bank balance sheet data is from the data publicly available on the Federal Reserve and ECB websites. The fiscal numbers are from IMF’s Fiscal Monitor (2009).
- 23.
- 24.
Some of the left corrections, such as higher taxes on extreme incomes and wealth and universal basic incomes that involve rewriting social contracts could possibly have been attempted during the boom. These are now much more difficult with stalling growth, absence of animal spirits, and bloated central bank and Treasury balance sheets.
- 25.
“Certainly prices of goods and services now being produced--our basic measure of inflation--matter. But what about futures prices or more importantly prices of claims on future goods and services, like equities, real estate, or other earning (financial) assets? Are stability of these prices essential to the stability of the economy? Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability” (The Federal Reserve Board 1996).
- 26.
Financial cycles are driven by both equity and debt. The period in the run up to the Global Financial Crisis witnessed a financial super cycle in Advanced Economies because it was driven by a boom in both asset prices and leverage, whereas in the post crisis period the financial cycle is basically driven by only a boom in equity prices.
- 27.
There are however at least three notable omissions in the post crisis regulatory rejig of the financial system. First, while the new leverage ratio under Basel III puts some roadblocks in the way of runaway leverage, the tax structure continues to favour debt over equity. Second, banks have been left with the option of determining their own risk weights, leaving them free to game their capital requirements. Third, while some steps have been taken to insulate MMFs from runs, the ‘mark to market’ model that according to Bair (2010), former chairperson of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, biases markets towards underestimating capital requirements during boom times, and can lead to fire sales during panics, has been left untouched (see also Forbes 2010).
- 28.
In a recent article in Financial Times, Rachman (2019), chief Foreign Affairs commentator, sees the globalized world yielding to a two bloc world dominated by the US and China.
- 29.
Cross country evidence indicates a fairly strong negative correlation between non-performing loans and economic growth (Balgova et al. 2016).
- 30.
It was at a G-10 meeting in Rome in 1971 that the US Treasury Secretary John Connally made what was then considered an astonishing statement to his counterparts “the dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”
References
Akin, C., & Kose, M. A. (2007, December 1). Changing nature of North-South linkages: Stylized facts and explanations. IMF Working Paper WP/07/280. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=21423.
Arnold, M. (2018, September 17). How US Banks took over the financial world. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/6d9ba066-9eee-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4.
Bair, S. C. (2010). Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, January 14, 2010. https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2010/spjan1410.html.
Balgova, M., Nies, M., & Plekhanov, A. (2016, October). The economic impact of reducing non-performing loans. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Working Paper #193. https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/economic-impact.html.
Bank of International Settlements (2018, June 24). Annual Economic Report 2018. https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e.htm.
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R. (2003, August). Banking concentration and crises. NBER Working Paper 9921. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9921.
Bernanke, B. S. (1994). The macroeconomics of the great depression: A comparative approach. NBER Working Paper 4814, August 1994. https://www.nber.org/papers/w4814.pdf.
Bernanke, B. S. (2003). Speech at the Japanese Society of Monetary Economics, Tokyo, Japan, August 1994. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030531/default.htm.
Bernanke, B. S. (2002). https://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/. Remarks at a conference, University of Chicago, Illinois, November 8, 2002.
Bernanke, B. S. (2005). The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Virginia, March 10, 2005. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/default.htm.
Bernanke, B. S. (2007). The Sub-Prime Mortgage Market, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois, May 17, 2007. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm.
Bernanke, B. S. (2010). Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January 3, 2010. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm.
Bernanke, B. S. (2015). Why are interest rates so low, part 3: The Global Savings Glut, Brookings, April 1, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2015/04/01/why-are-interest-rates-so-low-part-3-the-global-savings-glut/.
Bernanke, B. S., Reinhart, V. R., Sack, B. P. (2004). Monetary policy alternatives at the Zero bound: An empirical assessment, Staff Working Paper # 48, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve, Washington, D.C. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2004/06/2004b_bpea_bernanke.pdf.
Ben S. Bernanke, Monetary Policy in a New Era, Brookings Institution, October 2, 2017. file:///D:/dropbox/Dropbox/ongoing/bernanke_rethinking_macro_final_monetary%20policy%20in%20the%20new%20era.pdf.
Bhattacharya, J., & Haslag, J. H. (1999). Monetary policy arithmetic: Some recent contributions, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review, Third Quarter 1999. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.199.4767&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Blanchard, O. (2019). Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Association Presidential Lecture, Peterson Institute for International Economics and MIT, January 2019. https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2019conference/program/pdf/14020_paper_etZgfbDr.pdf.
Blanchard, O., & Summers, L. (2017). Rethinking stabilization policy: Back to the future, Petersen Institute for International Economics, October 8, 2017. https://piie.com/system/files/documents/blanchard-summers20171012paper.pdf.
Bradford De Long, J., & Lawrence, H. (2012). Summers, Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy, March 20, 2012, https://delong.typepad.com/20120320-conference-draft-final-candidate-delong-summers-brookings-fiscal-policy-in-a-depressed-economy-1.32.pdf.
Brown, E. C. (1956). Fiscal policy in the thirties: A reappraisal, The American Economic Review, 46(5), December 1956. http://static.stevereads.com/papers_to_read/fiscal_policy_in_the_thirties_a_reappraisal.pdf.
Canuto, O. (2019). China’s growth rebalance with downslide, Academia.edu, March 2019. https://www.academia.edu/38477037/China_s_Growth_Rebalance_with_Downslide?email_work_card=title.
Christiano, L. J., Motto, R., & Rostagno, M. (2004). The great depression and Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis. NBER Working Paper 10255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10255.
Conference Board. (2018). The conference board total economy database™, March 2018. https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762.
Correia, I., Farhi, E., Nicolini, J. P., & Teles, P. (2012). Unconventional fiscal policy at the zero bound. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department, Working Paper 698. https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp698.pdf.
Dotsey, M. (1994). Some Not So Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper 95-02, June 1994 (Revised March 1995). Retrieved from https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/working_papers/1995/pdf/wp95-2.pdf.
Eggertsson, G. B. (2005). Great Expectations and the End of the Depression. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report no. 234 December 2005, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr234.pdf.
Eggertsson, G. B., Mehrotra, N. R., Summers, L. H. (2016). Secular Stagnation in the Open Economy. NBER Working Paper # 22172, April 2016. https://www.nber.org/papers/w22172.pdf.
Eichengreen, B. (1986). The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, NBER Working Paper No. 2001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA; also available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w2001.pdf.
Eichengreen, B. (2010). Lessons of the crisis for emerging markets. International Economics and Economic Policy, 7(1). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-010-0149-9.
Eichengreen, B., O’Rourke, K. (2012). A tale of two depressions redux, VOX, CEPR Policy Portal, March 6, 2012, https://voxeu.org/article/tale-two-depressions-redux.
Financial Stability Board. (2017). Assessment of shadow banking activities: risks and the adequacy of post-crisis policy tools to address financial stability concerns, May 3, 2017. http://www.fsb.org/2017/07/assessment-of-shadow-banking-activities-risks-and-the-adequacy-of-post-crisis-policy-tools-to-address-financial-stability-concerns/.
Financial Stability Board. (2018a). List of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), November 16, 2018. http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161118-1.pdf.
Financial Stability Board. (2018b). Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms 28 November 2018 4th Annual Report, http://www.fsb.org/2018/11/implementation-and-effects-of-the-g20-financial-regulatory-reforms-fourth-annual-report/.
Financial Stability Board. (2019). Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018, February 4, 2019. http://www.fsb.org/2019/02/global-monitoring-report-on-non-bank-financial-intermediation-2018/.
Fishback, P. V. (2010). U.S.Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the 1930s, NBER Working Paper 16477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w16477.
Forbes, S. (2010). Transcript: Shiela Bair. Forbes Magazine, August 2, 2010. https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/30/bair-lehman-bank-failure-intelligent-investing-fdic.html#99add6d454b3.
Friedman, Milton. (1963). Inflation causes and consequences. New York: Asian Publishing House.
Greenspan, A. (2002). ‘Opening Remarks’, in Rethinking Stabilization Policy, A Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, August 29–31, 2002. https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2002/pdf/S02Greenspan.pdf.
Hakkio, C. S. (2013). The Great Moderation 1982–2007, Federal Reserve History, Richmond, USA. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_moderation.
IMF Fiscal Monitor July 2009. IMF Fiscal Affairs Department database. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2018/10/04/fiscal-monitor-october-2018.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2018. World economic outlook: Challenges to steady growth, IMF, Washington D.C. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/09/24/world-economic-outlook-october-2018.
Irwin, D. A. (1996). The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A quantitative assessment. NBER Working Paper No. 5509, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA. Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/papers/w5509.pdf.
International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS). (2011). A Review of Global Fiscal Stimulus, EC-IILS Joint Paper Discussion, Series 5, International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—inst/documents/publication/wcms_194175.pdf.
Kagan, R. (2019). The strong men strike back, The Washington Post, March 14, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2019/03/14/feature/the-strongmen-strike-back/?utm_term=.6f07a8932ae3.
Krugman, P. R. (1998). It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1998/06/1998b_bpea_krugman_dominquez_rogoff.pdf.
Kuttner, K. N., Posen, A. S. (2002). Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in Japan. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 16, 536–558. Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.612.68&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Lewis, A. (1979). “The Slowing Down of the Engine of Growth”, 1979. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1979/lewis-lecture.html.
Mishel, L., Gould, E., & Bivens, J. (2015). Wage stagnation in nine charts. Economic Policy Institute, January 6, 2015. https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/.
Mislinki, J. (2019). Adviser Perspectives, January 23, 2019. https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2019/01/23/fhfa-house-price-index-house-prices-up-0-4-in-november.
OECD (Year). Trade in Value Added (TIVA) database. http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuring-trade-in-value-added.htm#access.
Onaran, Y. (2017). Too Big to Fail, Bloomberg December 9, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/big-fail.
Pew Research Centre, August 7, 2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/ft_18-07-26_hourlywage_feature/.
Rachman, G. (2019). The US, China and the return of a two-bloc world. Financial Times, March 11, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/35accdc0-43de-11e9-a965-23d669740bfb.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2014). Recovery from financial crises: Evidence from 100 episodes. American Economic Review. Papers & Proceedings 2014, 104(5): 50–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.50.
Robinson, E., Nguyen, L., & Onaran, Y. (2018). On the Eve of Brexit, U.S. Banks Are Set to Conquer Europe. Bloomberg Quint, December 13, 2018. https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/on-the-eve-of-brexit-u-s-banks-are-set-to-conquer-europe#gs.GJUklikK
Romer, C. D. (1993). The nation in depression, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 7, Number 2-Spring 1993-Pages 19-39, https://eml.berkeley.edu/~cromer/Reprints/The%20Nation%20in%20Depression.pdf.
Romer, C. D. (2011). What do we know about the effects of fiscal policy? Hamilton College, USA, November 7, 2011. https://docplayer.net/63271167-What-do-we-know-about-the-effects-of-fiscal-policy-separating-evidence-from-ideology.html.
Romer, C. D. (1991). What ended the great depression? NBER Working Paper No. 3829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA; also available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w3829.pdf.
Sanchez, J. M., & Kim, H. S. (2018). Why is inflation so low, regional economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, USA; also available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/first-quarter-2018/why-inflation-so-low.
Sargent, T. J., Wallace, N. (1981). Some unpleasant Monetarist arithmetic, Federal Reserve of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Retrieved from https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr531.pdf.
Schildbach, J. (2018). Fitness programme continues: European banks become leaner, but stronger. Deutsche Bank, July 11, 2018, https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=RPS_EN-PROD&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&document=PROD0000000000472373#.
Sheel, A. (2007). Sub-prime and monetary policy, Business Standard, New Delhi, September 14, 2007. https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/alok-sheel-sub-prime-and-monetary-policy-107091401028_1.html.
Sheel, A. (2011). Eurozone’s impossible trinity, Business Standard, New Delhi, November 24, 2011. https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/alok-sheel-euro-zone-s-impossible-trinity-111112400047_1.html.
Sheel, A. (2013). Growth or Austerity: The Policy Dilemma (with C. Rangarajan), ICRA Bulletin, Money and Finance, February 2013.
Sheel, A. (2014). “G 20 and the Policy Response to the Global Financial Crisis” in (eds.) Callaghan, M., Ghate, C., Pickford, S., & Rathinam, F. Global Cooperation Among G20 Countries: Responding to the Crisis and Restoring Growth (Springer, New Delhi, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York 2014) Part VI. Austerity and Growth, pp. 241–80.
Sheel, A., & Ganguly, M. (2016). Financial Regulatory Reform: A Mid-Term Assessment from an Emerging Market Perspective. In (Eds.). Rajat Kathuria & Neetika Kaushal Nagpal, Global Economic Cooperation. Views from G 20 Countries. Springer, 2016, Chapter 10.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2009). Capitalist fools. Vanity Fair, 51(1); also available at https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2009/01/stiglitz200901.
Summers, L. H. (2018). Secular Stagnation has not gone away, Financial Times, May 6, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/aa76e2a8-4ef2-11e8-9471-a083af05aea7.
Summers, L. H., & Rachel, L., On falling neutral real rates, fiscal policy and the risk of secular stagnation. In Brookings Papers on Economic Activity BPEA Conference Drafts, March 7-8, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/On-Falling-Neutral-Real-Rates-Fiscal-Policy-and-the-Risk-of-Secular-Stagnation.pdf.
Taylor, J. B. (2010a). The fed and the crisis: A response to Ben Bernanke. The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2010. Retrieved from https://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/2010_pdfs/Fed-Crisis-A-Reply-to-Ben-Bernanke-WSJ-Jan-10-2010.pdf.
Taylor, J. B. (2010b). Macroeconomic lessons from the great deviation. Remarks at the 25th NBER macro annual meeting, May 2010. https://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/NBERMacroAnnualTalkFinal.pdf.
The Economist (2008). Emerging markets. The Decoupling Debate, March 6, 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10809267.
True Economics (2013). IMF assessment of the Euro Area banking sector risks - part 3, March 15, 2013. http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2013/03/1532013-imf-assessment-of-euro-area_5878.html.
The Economist (2017). A decade after the crisis, how are the world’s banks doing?, Special Report, May 6, 2017. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/05/06/a-decade-after-the-crisis-how-are-the-worlds-banks-doing.
The Federal Reserve Board (1996). Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C, December 5, 1996. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm.
Uribe, M. (2016). Is the monetarist arithmetic unpleasant? NBER Working Paper 22866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, USA. Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/papers/w22866.pdf.
US Government Accountability Office, 2011, Report to Congressional Addressees, Federal Reserve System, July 2011. https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11696.pdf.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sheel, A. (2019). The Global Economy and Financial Markets 10 Years After the Global Financial Crisis. In: Kathuria, R., Kukreja, P. (eds) 20 Years of G20. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8106-5_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8106-5_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-8105-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-8106-5
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)