Abstract
This chapter explores the transcendental nature of the self, will and agency because it is the self in its form of will and agency which explains human actions and experience. The notion of self has been analysed from both the empirical and the transcendental standpoint.
The concept of self has been at the centre of controversy since Hume who denied the possibility of the Cartesian substance-self. From then on, there have been many attempts to bring back the self. Both Kant and Wittgenstein have brought back the self as the transcendental self that is the centre of all our knowledge, language and action.
In this chapter it has been argued that it is the transcendental or the metaphysical self which is the centre of our language and knowledge. Therefore in order to situate meaning, consciousness and the world in the proper perspective, we need the transcendental self which is not part of the world but is the presupposition of the world.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1975). First person. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Descartes, R. (1912). Meditations on the first philosophy (J. Veitch, Trans.). London: J.M. Dent and Sons.
Flanagan, O. (2007). The really hard problem: Meaning in a material world. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Heidegger, M. (1978). Being and time (J. Mcquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and Revised by P.H. Nidditch, 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Allen and Unwin.
Kant, I. (1929). The critique of pure reason (N. K. Smith, Trans.). London: Macmillan.
Kant, I. (1956). The critique of practical reason (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2008). The constitution of agency. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nietzsche, F. (1967). The will to power (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: Random House.
Paton, H. J. (1936). Kant’s metaphysics of experience (Vol. II). London: Allen and Unwin.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.
Schopenhauer, A. (1958). The world as will and representation (2 Vols.) (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications.
Searle, J. R. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press.
Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Sellars, W. (1963). Philosophy and the image of man. In Science, perception and reality. New York: Humanities Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen.
Taylor, C. (1985). Human agency and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961a). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961b). Notebooks 1914–1916 (G. E. M. Anscome, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pradhan, R.C. (2019). Self, Will and Agency. In: Mind, Meaning and World. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7228-5_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7228-5_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-7227-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-7228-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)