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Wittgenstein on Self, Meaning and World

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Abstract

In this chapter I will discuss Wittgenstein’s views on self, meaning and world in an attempt to bring out the connections between self, language and the world within a transcendental framework. Wittgenstein has opted for a transcendental way of bringing out the connections between language and logic on the one hand and the world on the other. From his early philosophy in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1961a) and to his later philosophy in the Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953, 2009), he has pursued a method of understanding language and the world which can be called transcendental (Shwayder 1969: 66–70; Stenius 1960; Pradhan 2008). Though he calls his early philosophy transcendental, he calls his later philosophy grammatical (Wittgenstein 1953, 2009) in nature. However, we can consider Wittgenstein as a transcendental philosopher in general as he has given up the empiricist and the naturalist way of interpreting language and the world.

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Pradhan, R.C. (2019). Wittgenstein on Self, Meaning and World. In: Mind, Meaning and World. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7228-5_1

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