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Diversity of Experimental Methods in Economics pp 23–37Cite as

Laboratory Experiments in Game Theory

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Abstract

This chapter discusses several issues in experimental game theory. Since its inception in the 1950s, experimental game theory has now grown into a field with large literature, still attracting many young researchers (Kagel and Roth in The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Camerer in Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We will later see that the absence of crucial experiments also applies to natural sciences in a sense, a claim known as Duem-Quine thesis.

  2. 2.

    In a sense, this idea is similar to the one held by current market designers.

  3. 3.

    The concept of bounded rationality was coined and has been developed by Herbert Simon. Thus, the term was accompanied by Simon’s own connotations. Richard Thaler used the term “quasi rationality” rather than bounded rationality in the 1980s and 1990s. However, bounded rationality has been increasingly accepted by behavioral economists since the early 2000s. Heukelom (2014, p. 182) vividly describes the historical process where the dichotomy between the descriptive and the normative in terms of Kahneman and Tversky’s legacy was transformed to the current one between rationality and bounded rationality in behavioral economics.

  4. 4.

    Here \( \supset \) denotes implication.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, Chuo University, Hachioji, Japan

    Takizawa Hirokazu

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  1. Takizawa Hirokazu
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Correspondence to Takizawa Hirokazu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Future University Hakodate, Hokkaido, Japan

    Toshiji Kawagoe

  2. Chuo University, Hachioji, Tokyo, Japan

    Hirokazu Takizawa

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Hirokazu, T. (2019). Laboratory Experiments in Game Theory. In: Kawagoe, T., Takizawa, H. (eds) Diversity of Experimental Methods in Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6065-7_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6065-7_2

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