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Addressing Relay Attacks Without Distance-Bounding in RFID Tag Inclusion/Exclusion Scenarios

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Advances in Signal Processing and Intelligent Recognition Systems (SIRS 2018)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 968))

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Abstract

With the widespread adoption and use of RFID tags, a valid scenario is one in which an RFID-tagged object includes several components that each have their own individual RFID tags. Under such a context, each of the components are bound to be included in or excluded from the main object over its lifetime. In order for only the tags that are a part of the main object to be authenticated by the main object, there is a need for a secure protocol that ensures that no other tag has access to the shared secrets among the main object and the component objects. Moreover, there is also a need to address relay attacks by adversaries under such scenarios. Existing authentication protocols address relay attacks through round-trip distance measurements in such inclusion/exclusion scenarios. While this works in principle, distance-bounding approaches are not always reliable. We consider another approach for inclusion/exclusion scenarios and develop a protocol sketch for this context. We also provide related security analysis.

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Correspondence to Selwyn Piramuthu .

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Piramuthu, S. (2019). Addressing Relay Attacks Without Distance-Bounding in RFID Tag Inclusion/Exclusion Scenarios. In: Thampi, S., Marques, O., Krishnan, S., Li, KC., Ciuonzo, D., Kolekar, M. (eds) Advances in Signal Processing and Intelligent Recognition Systems. SIRS 2018. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 968. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5758-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5758-9_13

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-5757-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-5758-9

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