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A Constructive China in the International Community

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Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall
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Abstract

It is this author’s view that China will evolve into a constructive power in the international stage upon fulfillment or improvement on several key fronts including settlement of territorial disputes through legitimate channels, contribution to global efforts against environmental pollution and global warming, improvement of human rights records, and promotion of government accountability and transparency.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Editor, “Constructivism (international relations)”, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_(international_relations).

  2. 2.

    John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011), p. 237.

  3. 3.

    See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), pp. 92–138, 313–369.

  4. 4.

    Editor, “The Constructive Powers Initiative” (Centre for International Governance Innovation), https://www.cigionline.org/activity/constructive-powers-initiative.

  5. 5.

    Yudan Chen, Philosphy, “Identity, and Role Theory with Chinese Characteristics”, in Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (eds.), China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order? (Routledge, New York and London, 2016), p. 123. Suisheng Zhao, “China as a Rising Power versus the US-led World” 1 (1) China’s Rsing Role in Global Governance: Opportunities & Challenges (2016) 13–21. Fu Ying, Chinese former vice foreign minister and a personal aide to President Xi Jinping, explained that “China has neither the intention nor ability to overturn the existing order.” Ying Fu, “Under the Same Roof: China’s View of Global Order,” Huffington Post (November 11, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-ying/china-global-order_b_8537918.html?utm_hp_ref=world.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    See Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights : The Limits of Compliance (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 1–17 & 194–231.

  8. 8.

    See Bates Gill and Michael Schiffer, A Rising China’s Rising Responsibilities (Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World, the Stanley Foundation, Working Paper, November 2008) 5–14, available at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/eib/rising_powers_eib/resource_materials/RisingChina.pdf.

  9. 9.

    Yukon Huang, “China’s Road to Becoming a ‘Responsible’ World Power”, Financial Times (March 26, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/26/china-s-road-to-becoming-responsible-world-power-pub-51323.

  10. 10.

    Robert B Zoellick (Deputy Secretary of State), “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” (Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City, September 21, 2005), available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. He stated: “[t]he United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century”.

  11. 11.

    Ibid. “Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences—we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits”.

  12. 12.

    Ibid, Zoellick stated: “All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” and “From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better served by working with us to shape the future international system”.

  13. 13.

    Weizhun Mao, “Debating China’s International Responsibility” 10 (2) The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2017) 184; See also Bing Wu, “Construction of China’s Identity as A Responsible Great Power since the Economic Reforms and Opening Up” 4 Socialism Studies (2014), the electronic version is available at http://www.cssn.cn/zzx/201409/t20140917_1330453.shtml.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    See Linda Jakobson, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma (Analyses, Lowy Institute, February 5, 2013), electronic version available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-foreign-policy-dilemma.

  17. 17.

    For instance, Zhenxing Li, On the Image of a Responsible Great Power (unpublished Master Thesis, International Politics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 2005) 9–10; Jindong Zhang, On the Creation of the Image of China’s “Responsible Power”: Taking China-Africa Relationship as an Example (unpublished Master Thesis, International Relations, Central China Normal University, 2009) 23–25 & 33–35; Wu, supra note 13.

  18. 18.

    Jakobson, supra note 16.

  19. 19.

    See Yaqing Qin (Dean of the Diplomatic Academy, Shandong Normal University), “The Connotation of Diplomacy of Great Powers with Chinese Characteristics”, Guang Ming Daily (August 30, 2017), http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0830/c40531-29503248.html. See also the State Council, “China’s peaceful development 2011” (the white paper), in which China explicitly defines state sovereignty and territorial integrity as core Chinese interests. The core national interests are identified as: (1) state sovereignty; (2) national security; (3) territorial integrity; (4) national reunification; (5) China’s political system established by the constitution and overall social stability; and (6) basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

  20. 20.

    Valérie Niquet, “China’s Future Role in World Affairs: An Enigma?” 5 Politique étrangère (2008) 51.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    See Robert D Kaplan, “Don’t Panic about China”, The Atlantic (October, 2005), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/10/dont-panic-about-china/307926/.

  23. 23.

    Hu Jintao, Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress.

  24. 24.

    Julia Bowie, “China: A Responsible Stakeholder ? An Important Term for Asia Watchers, Does Beijing Make the Cut?”, The National Interest (May 10, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-responsible-stakeholder-16131.

  25. 25.

    See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996), p. 363; See also Rosita Dellios and R James Ferguson, China’s Quest for Global Order: From Peaceful Rise to Harmonious World (Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2013), pp. 74–75.

  26. 26.

    Harnisch, supra note 5, at 123.

  27. 27.

    Jimin Chen, “Understanding China’s Peaceful Development”, China-US Focus (Foreign Policy, February 17, 2014), https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/understanding-chinas-peaceful-development. Three unwanted ways of interpreting China’s peaceful development strategy are identified: “(1) China’s peaceful development is expedient; (2) peaceful development is unconditional; (3) peaceful development can be used as a “magic screw” to restrict China’s international actions”

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Supra note 24.

  30. 30.

    Robert D Kaplan “The Geography of Chinese Power”, The New York Time (Opinion, April 19, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20iht-edkaplan.html.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

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Wei, Y. (2019). A Constructive China in the International Community. In: Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3699-7_10

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