Abstract
China as a civilisation and great historical power has rather different ontological perspective, in comparison with Western superpowers. Metaphorically, China resembles largely the existence of an elephant in the jungle, while Western superpowers are closer to that of lions. Only if the political episteme of the West is reflected upon and the fundamental divergence between the worldviews of China and the West is taken into consideration, China’s agenda regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, and, in general, her ‘national’ orientations could be rendered intelligible. Instead of being of an expansionist project as Western hegemonic view often suggests, this paper argues reviving the historical Silk Road connection is primarily a self-referential cultural imperative for China. She is seeking to return to her cultural and historical self as a civilisation through the regeneration of the Chinese (regional) world order. When such an order is reinstated, China would be able to understand herself culturally and fulfil her civilisational mission in the modern era.
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15 February 2019
This book was inadvertently published with errors in the FM and chapters 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15 and 18.
Notes
- 1.
The author is well aware of the problem of over-generalisation when the ideas of ‘the West’, ‘Western world’ or ‘Western societies’ are invoked. The unity of perspective of the West is for certain a myth. See for example Delanty (2003) for the discussion of the idea of ‘post-Western Europe’. But those notions are still deployed in this article mainly for referential purpose of a (fragmented) civilisation, which is fundamentally different from China. The West here refers mainly to the United States and United Kingdom, which articulate ‘China Threat’ explicitly in their political rhetoric, but not limited to them.
- 2.
China is usually referred to as dragon in general usage, which is the totemic symbol of the Chinese people. The connotation of dragon as a mythic creature however varies greatly across cultures. The author deems the image of elephant more appropriate in capturing the non-aggressive nature of Chinese civilisation that would form a meaningful contrast to the lion-like nature of Western civilisation.
- 3.
According to Parsons’ theory, all social systems have to fulfil four functional pre-requisites, namely adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern-maintenance, so to survive. But different types of social systems have their own priorities.
- 4.
These two quotations are taken from ‘Xi Jinping says world has nothing to fear from awakening of “peaceful lion” in South China Morning Post, dated 28 March 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1459168/xi-says-world-has-nothing-fear-awakening-peaceful-lion
- 5.
In other version of this saying, China was named the sleeping giant. No matter it is the lion or the giant, the meaning is consistent. Giant by its very presence dwarfs others, and so in a similar sense reflects the anxious consciousness and no less the self-perception of Western powers when they look at China.
- 6.
- 7.
A popular traditional Chinese story passed on as legend.
- 8.
In addition to political analysis, America’s existential anxiety of its leadership position and survival manifests also in popular culture. A very common theme in Hollywood movies, much less frequently seen in other cinemas, is that America is under siege by its enemies from different places, other planets, alien species, or from the future.
- 9.
The idea of the ‘Great Game’ describes the competition between Russian and UK in Central Asia during the nineteenth century.
- 10.
In Reuters ‘Australia, U.S., India and Japan in talks to establish Belt and Road alternative: report’ (dated 19 February 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-beltandroad-quad/australia-u-s-india-and-japan-in-talks-to-establish-belt-and-road-alternative-report-idUSKCN1G20WG; In SCMP ‘US may boost projects in Indo-Pacific to counter Beijing’s belt and road plan’ (dated 8 February 2018) http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2132435/us-may-boost-projects-indo-pacific-counter-beijings
- 11.
In contrast to being the appendage to culture and morality, power connects intimately with violence and domination, and is the basis of morality in the West. Max Weber (1946: 78) famously defines state, the most salient political actor, to be ‘human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given community’ is a telling case in point.
- 12.
China never took her vassals as colonies like the Western imperial states did. China was situated at the top echelon of the Chinese order mainly because of her cultural and moral superiority.
- 13.
In general, China’s interest in expanding territory into neighbouring areas was moderate. Engulfing neighbouring states in most situations was expedient means to prevent the nomadic tribes in north-western China from disrupting the order of the Zhongyuan area, the central plain and the cradle of Chinese civilisation. The Xinjiang area, long referred to as the Xiyu, was annexed by China in Qing dynasty because of the increasingly frequent political activities that was hazardous to the security of the Chinese capital is a case in point (Kim 2004).
- 14.
The hypocrisy of justice and autonomy of nations that they however have to yield to ‘universal values’ or ‘universal standards’, defined by the West is now an open secret about the Westphalian nation-state system (Ling 2014: 1).
- 15.
China was not always the superordinate partner. In Song dynasty, for example, China was the subordinate partner, the nephew, to her militarily stronger neighbours. But the personified principle guiding the foreign relations between China and her neighbours was consistent.
- 16.
The semantics of the Chinese term for gift —‘li wu’ means literally the object for ‘li’, rituals and ceremonies.
- 17.
Chinese government bore the cost of the embassies in the capital and returned expensive gifts in exchange for the tributes she received. The gifts from the Chinese emperors to the envoys were necessary recompense for the ritualistic subordination for her vassals. These are also the reasons why foreign representatives in most cases had to preform a series of rituals to the Chinese emperors, including kowtowing, to demonstrate such symbolic subservience.
- 18.
This concept is mobilised frequently by Chinese leaders in the last few years in international speeches. For the discussion of the meaning and implication, refer to Zhang (2018).
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Acknowledgement
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Hoi-Man Chan from the Department of Sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He had read through the manuscript and provided valuable insights for its revision. I also like to thank the reviewers for their comments. All remaining mistakes and insufficiencies are mine.
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Chan, SH. (2019). Imagining China in the New Silk Road: The Elephant and the World Jungle. In: Islam, M.N. (eds) Silk Road to Belt Road. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2998-2_3
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