Abstract
In a typical patron-client relation, the patron provides clients with the privileged access to state-sponsored properties in exchange for their support to the clients. Assuming that economic actors maximize their own benefits, such a patron-client relation is an equilibrium outcome under the prevailing political institutions. This chapter discusses this issue in detail in the context of Bangladesh. It has been shown that the country’s industrial policy has failed to create a broad base of industrial sector. Some family-based conglomerates which have their roots in the British or Pakistan period are still dominating the industrial sector. In postindependent Bangladesh, government nationalization policy hindered the growth of private enterprises to a great extent. Improper privatization policies, which nurtured mainly nepotism and cronyism, have failed miserably to develop a diverse industrial sector, which, in turn, resulted in a small and concentrated business class. Given the embedded weakness of the political parties, the business sector squeezes undue benefits out of state’s weakness. Various evidences are provided to support this argument.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Bangladesh’s politics now in pockets of businessmen, The Daily Star, October 13, 2015.
- 2.
Judiciary working independently, The Daily Star, October 04, 2015.
- 3.
Bangladesh Bank, Annual Report, 2016–2017.
- 4.
“Litany of allegations”, The Daily Star, February 5, 2007.
- 5.
Ibid.
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
Sonali’s Tk 129cr interest waiver surprises many, The Daily Star, April 25, 2007.
- 8.
Founding directors borrowed six times of their capital, Banik Barta, May 10, 2017.
References
Abdullah, A. (1991). Modernisation at Bay: Structure and Change in Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press Ltd.
Amjad, R. (1982). Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan: 1960–1970. Cambridge University Press.
Aremu, F., & Miah, M. D. (2008). Institutional Constraints and Economic Backwardness: Evidence from Nigeria and Bangladesh. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 32(2), 19–48.
Guhathakurta, M. (2002). The Nature of the Bangladeshi State. In Ain O Salish Kendra (Ed.), Human Rights in Bangladesh (pp. 19–31). Dhaka: University Press Limited.
Hashim, S. (2018, March 13). Why the Endless Bailouts of State-Owned Banks? The Daily Star.
Huque, A. S. (1988). Politics and administration in Bangladesh: problems of participation. Dhaka: University Press Ltd.
Islam, M., Shahid, A., Chaudhury, A. J., and Siddique, M. (1999). Bank Loan Default Problem in Bangladesh: A dialogue Between Borrowers and Lenders. Bank Parikrama, XXIV (2): 22–31.
Islam, S. (1987). Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase. Asian Survey, 27(2), 163–172.
Jahan, R., & Amundsen, I. (2012). The Parliament of Bangladesh. Representation and Accountability. Dhaka: Center for Policy Dialogue. CPD-CMI Working Paper, 2.
Khan, M. H. (1989). Clientelism, corruption and capitalist development: an analysis of state intervention with special reference to Bangladesh (Thesis). University of Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.16517
Khan, A. R., Hossain, D. M., & Siddiqui, J. (2011). Corporate Ownership Concentration and Audit Fees: The Case of an Emerging Economy. Advances in Accounting, 27(1), 125–131.
Kochanek, S. A. (1993). Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Kochanek, S. A. (1996). The Rise of Interest Politics in Bangladesh. Asian Survey, 36(7), 704–722.
Maniruzzaman, T. (1980). The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
Mollah, M. A. H. (2011). Growth and Development of Civil Service and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh: An Overview. South Asian Survey, 18(1), 137–156.
Momen, N. (2007). Implementation of Privatization Policy: Lessons from Bangladesh. The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 12, 14.
Nuruzzaman, M. (2004). Neoliberal economic reforms, the rich and the poor in Bangladesh. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 34(1), 33–54.
Papanek, G. F. (1967). Pakistan’s development, social goals and private incentives. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Rahman, M. (2007). Market-State-Civil Society Relations and Development in Post-Independent Bangladesh: Some Theoretical Reflections. Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology, 4(2), 4–15.
Sarker, A. E. (2008). Patron-Client Politics and Its Implications for Good Governance in Bangladesh. International Journal of Public Administration, 31(12), 1416–1440.
Sobhan, R. (1980). Growth and Contradictions within the Bangladesh Bourgeoisie. Journal of Social Studies, 9, 1–27.
Sobhan, R. (1991). An Industrial Strategy for Industrial Policy: Redirecting the Industrial Development of Bangladesh in the 1990s. The Bangladesh Development Studies, 19(1/2), 201–215.
Suzuki, Y., Miah, M., & Jinyi, Y. (2008). China’s Non-Performing Bank Loan Crisis: The Role of Economic Rents. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 22(1), 57–70.
Uddin, S. (2005). Privatization in Bangladesh: The Emergence of ‘Family Capitalism.’ Development and Change, 36(1), 157–182.
Uddin, S., & Hopper, T. (2003). Accounting for Privatisation for Bangladesh: Testing World Bank Claims. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 14(7), 739–774.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Miah, M.D., Suzuki, Y. (2018). Patron-Client Politics and the Rise of the Business Class. In: Power, Property Rights, and Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2763-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2763-6_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-2762-9
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-2763-6
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)