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Bilateral Challenges and Korean Anxieties

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China, South Korea, and the Socotra Rock Dispute
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Abstract

This chapter examines the influence of wider bilateral and regional challenges on this dispute. It particularly notes the increasingly fraught nature of ties between the two neighbors since the early 2000s, when the optimism of the 1990s was replaced by more ‘realism and mixed feelings’. The rise in bilateral frictions over the feature has come in the midst of wider mutual anxieties about the strategic and economic objectives of the other side. China’s concerns are mainly security-based in relation to national defense and access to resources. Heightened Republic of Korea (ROK) unease regarding rightful jurisdiction over the feature occurred in a context of growing Chinese influence on the peninsula where South Koreans increasingly felt that a rising China was a threat to Korean sovereignty both north and south and its symbols, touching upon sensitivities concerning national identity and dignity. The chapter discusses the various broader challenges that both states have been attempting to address since the normalization of ties in 1992.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This took place in Tokyo, May 2018; see Mainichi Shimbun, 10/05/2018, ‘Japan, China agree on economic cooperation but differ over objectives’, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180510/p2a/00m/0na/003000c.

  2. 2.

    Gaogouli in Chinese.

  3. 3.

    Also Changbaishan in Chinese.

  4. 4.

    See http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_19560-1522-2-30.pdf?110608104012; 167.

  5. 5.

    For further insights and perspectives on the ebb and flow of popular sentiment and the influence of social media toward South Korea inside China, see any of the following: Frances Kitt, (11/05/2017), ‘In China, changing online attitudes towards Korea’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-changing-online-attitudes-towards-korea; Sunny Lee, (24/08/2008), ‘Anti-Korean Sentiment in China Overshadows Lee-Hu Summit Today’, Korea Times: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/sports/2009/04/253_29884.html; Sunny Lee, (09/03/2008), ‘Anti-Korean Sentiment in China Evolutionary’, Korea Times: https://web.archive.org/web/20120918115733/http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include/print.asp?newsIdx=30480; Moon Chung-in and Li Chun-fu (30/11/2010), ‘Reactive Nationalism and South Korea’s Foreign Policy on China and Japan: A Comparative Analysis’, Pacific Focus Inha Journal of International Studies 25, no. 3: 331–355: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2010.01048.x; Scott Snyder, (October 2008), ‘Post-Olympic Hangover: New Backdrop for Relations’, Comparative Connections 10, Issue 3: http://cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/0803qchina_korea.pdf.

  6. 6.

    See, for example Hong Soon-do, ‘Lotte Faces Boycott in China due to THAAD Conflict’, 25 January 2018: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/asiatoday/lotte-faces-boycott-in-ch_b_14382948.html; Cynthia Kim and Hyunjoo Jin, ‘Chinese Envoy Warns THAAD Deployment Would “Destroy” Ties’, 24 February 2016: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lotte-china-analysis/with-china-dream-shattered-over-missile-land-deal-lotte-faces-costly-overhaul-idUSKBN1CT35Y; Ankit Panda, ‘What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?’ 25 February 2016: https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/.

  7. 7.

    The shared resources zone was to be approximately 17.5 nmi on each side of the Provisional Waters Zone for four years, after which the zones would be split down the middle, with each half falling under the exclusive state control of the nearest country.

  8. 8.

    See http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_kor_65_2012.htm.

  9. 9.

    See https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/when-chinese-fishermen-become-pirates-in-the-yellow-sea/; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/world/asia/south-korea-china-fishermen-deaths.html.

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Fox, S. (2019). Bilateral Challenges and Korean Anxieties. In: China, South Korea, and the Socotra Rock Dispute. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2077-4_3

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