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The Global Collaboration against Transnational Corruption pp 61–108Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Institutionalization of OECD Anti-bribery Collaboration

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Abstract

Grasping the dynamic of the institutionalization process of the anti-bribery collaboration from the FCPA to the OECD Anti-bribery Convention is critical for the next step of analyzing the actual performance of these laws. Previous works, grounded in realist ideology, often reduce the dynamic process to a question of states’ free will and rational responses to expected payoffs in relative legislative strategies. This realist approach offers only speculative and inaccurate explanations that cannot sustain an understanding of the operation of the anti-bribery collaboration at successive stages. Instead, this study employs a historically contextual approach, stressing how decision-makers were constrained by existing and evolving institutions by analyzing the process of intertwined interactions among involved political parties, and concludes that the process of institutionalization is composed of a sequence of unavoidable choices by decision-makers in a concrete historical context. A lawmaking game among rational parties in an evolving context may plausibly result in altruistic consequences.

A part of this chapter was published in “The Dynamic of the Institutionalization of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention,” South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 11, 2014.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad,” hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Committee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 5 June 1975, p. 24 (Statement of Mark Feldman). Available at: http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011340574 (last visited: 14 June 2014).

  2. 2.

    In 1934, as a response to the economic crisis in 1929, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as a part of New Deal legislation, requiring companies whose shares were traded publicly to disclose important business information to investors. Then there were no provisions about whether it was necessary to disclose information on transnational bribery. It was until the enactment of the FCPA that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was revised to contain such provisions (Cragg and Woof 2002: 105).

  3. 3.

    For filed cases see DOJ Press Release, “FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions,” available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2012.html (last visited: 7 April 2014).

  4. 4.

    From US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Report No. 94-1031 to accompany S.3664, 2 July 1976, 1–9.

  5. 5.

    Given that the founder of TI, Peter Eigen had worked in the World Bank in Washington DC before he went to Germany and established TI, to some extent, TI can be seen as a tool of normative persuasion of the US. See TI press release, “Transparency International Founder Peter Eigen Honored by German Government,” available at: http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20130124_transparency_international_founder_peter_eigen_honoured_by_german (last visited: 14 June 2014).

  6. 6.

    See TI Press Release, “Corruption Perception Index,” available at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/ (last visited: 31 July 2014).

  7. 7.

    Prior to 1999, TI only issued a CPI that ranked almost 200 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. Since 1999, aware of the prevalence of cross-border bribery, TI began to issue the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) to measure the supply side of bribery. See Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Survey 1999, available at: http://www.transparency.org/content/download/2850/17712 (last visited: 2 April 2014).

  8. 8.

    For information on when and how countries other than the US abolished tax deduction policies for transnational bribery, see OECD Country Reports, available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited: 4 May 2014).

  9. 9.

    See OECD Press Release “Status of Ratification,” available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf (last visited: 12 June 2014).

  10. 10.

    Information about how all these countries joined the Convention comes from OECD Country Reports. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited: 17 July 2014). For information on OECD members and partners see OECD Press Release, “Members and Partners,” available at: http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited: 29 May 2014).

  11. 11.

    G20 Press Release, “G20 Members,” available at: https://www.g20.org/about_g20/g20_members (last visited: 31 July 2014).

  12. 12.

    For an English version of the Eighth Amendment to P.R.C. Penal Code see http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=lawandid=8568andCGid= (last visited: 17 January 2014).

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    Lianlian Liu

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Liu, L. (2019). The Institutionalization of OECD Anti-bribery Collaboration. In: The Global Collaboration against Transnational Corruption. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1138-3_2

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