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The Topic, Methodology, and Potential Contribution

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The Global Collaboration against Transnational Corruption

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Abstract

Transnational bribery regulation, with the OECD Anti-bribery Convention as the central governing legal instrument, is on the top agenda of global regulation of public affairs. However, the complex nature of transnational bribery regulation makes theoretical viewpoints on this topic rather fragmented. This used to help understand the wisdom of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) approach in the early years. However, as the FCPA approach was internationalized and evolves to its current phase, in which individual inquiries become path dependent and interdependent, the fragmentation of research causes more confusion than makes contribution. In view of this, this chapter organizes historical, solved questions and recently generated, unsolved questions in a coherent, progressive way; explores the key question to be answered under this systematic framework; and has a reflection on an equally powerful analytical perspective as a supplement to the current “problem-solving” approach. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter retrospect the historical trajectory of academic research on the global regulation of transnational bribery, systemize relevant theoretical insights, and illustrate how people’s understandings of the FCPA approach in early years affect their evaluations of the effect of the global collaboration in the contemporary era. Section 3 analyzes the structural flaws of the popular problem-solving paradigm for analyzing the effects of the anti-bribery collaboration. Section 4 has a reflection on the inherent limitation of the “problem-solving” analytical approach, and Section 5 discusses the possibility of taking a historically contextual approach as a good alternative.

A part of this chapter was published in “The Global Anti-bribery Collaboration in Evolution: A Systemic Analysis of Historical Puzzles and Key Contemporary Questions,” Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2015.

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    Lianlian Liu

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Liu, L. (2019). The Topic, Methodology, and Potential Contribution. In: The Global Collaboration against Transnational Corruption. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1138-3_1

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