Abstract
The post-tsunami house reconstruction programme in Sri Lanka was two pronged. Those within a ‘buffer zone’ were relocated while those outside the buffer zone were given assistance to rebuild in the same location. The relocated houses were built by donors (donor-driven). The re-built houses were built by the beneficiaries (owner-driven) with assistance. This study assesses the progress and effectiveness of each programme. The data for the study comes from a primary panel household survey carried out in April 2005 and repeated in July 2006. Results show that both the owner-driven and donor-driven housing programmes faced issues. In the owner-driven programme insufficient funds due to price increases, labour and material shortages delayed progress. In the donor-driven programme identification of new locations, suitability of the houses, and the locations for the beneficiaries and their lifestyles were the main issues. The main reason for the slow progress in housing was the declaration of the no-built buffer zone and the coordination problems in the donor-driven relocation programme (IPS 2006). Issues in finding land for relocation, and disagreements regarding the procedural requirements of the donor-driven programme, led to delays and abandonment of assistance by some donors. In the conflict-affected regions, access and coordinating with the LTTE also delayed progress. Despite this, many people got better housing in terms size and materials used for building. However, many relocated people were worse off in terms of access to facilities and infrastructure and places of employment (IPS 2006). Issues in sharing information in an unbiased and transparent manner created social tensions and problems of coordination and proper targeting. Overly centralized management of the donor-driven programme and lack of attention given to improving capacity of local institutions created bottle necks in the programmes. Establishment of village councils and a clear dispute-resolution mechanism minimized disputes in the owner-driven rebuilding programme.
The author is grateful to the IPS staff involved in the tsunami surveys and related studies. Special mention should be made of Paul Steele, Dushni Weerakoon, Kanchana Wickramasinghe and Priyanka Jayawardena. The paper draws on earlier IPS studies on post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction.
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Notes
- 1.
One of the three Task Forces set up by The Centre for National Operations (CNO) that was set up by the Ministry of Public Security, Law, and Order, to handle tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts.
- 2.
Grama Niladhari Division is the smallest administrative unit in Sri Lanka.
- 3.
This section summarizes the “Assistance Policy and Implementation Guidelines—Housing and Township Development” by the Presidential Secretariat.
- 4.
In the districts of Kilinochchi, Mannar (in Northern Province), Puttalam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara (in Western Province) and Galle, Matara, Hambantota (in the Southern Province) the buffer zone was 100 m landwards from the mean high water line, while in the districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara (in the Eastern Province) the buffer zone was 200 m from the mean high water line. The Survey Department, the Urban Development Authority (UDA) and the Coastal Conservation Department (CCD) were given the responsibility of demarcating the buffer zone.
- 5.
Homeowners with tsunami-damaged houses who were citizens of Sri Lanka, who have permanently settled in the GSW affected by the tsunami, and were able to demonstrate land ownership, were eligible for the grant.
- 6.
No donor was allowed to assist to rebuild a house in the no-built zone, and a beneficiary receiving assistance from a donor outside the government housing programme was still eligible for assistance under the government housing programme.
- 7.
The study initially attempted to survey all tsunamiiaffected districts. But, due to access problems, the survey could not be carried out in the LTTE-controlled Jaffna and Mullaitivu districts.
- 8.
5% died during the tsunami.
- 9.
Only 9% of households had family members involved in construction, and only 7% said family members were willing to be trained in construction, while only 5% of the households had equipment needed for house building.
- 10.
Sand was particularly difficult to obtain, and many building materials were rising in price. About one-third of the households were sure of getting help from the community to rebuild, while a slightly higher number were willing to help others to rebuild.
- 11.
About 68% were very concerned about the distance to the sea, while 11% were unconcerned about the sea.
- 12.
Although all relocated houses were moved to one location, they had to leave behind neighbours whose houses were outside the no-build zone.
- 13.
The highlighted points are based on results that were statistically significant at more than 10% level.
- 14.
Some houses had both the roof and the wall of permanent material while others had either the roof or the walls of permanent materials.
- 15.
About, 53% of the surveyed houses made unusable by the tsunami were less than 450 ft2, while only 10% were bigger than 600 ft2.
- 16.
About 32% of roofs of the surveyed houses were made of cadjan or metal sheets, while close to half the surveyed houses had walls made of temporary material.
- 17.
About 13% of surveyed households inside the buffer zone owned houses on government land, while a further 9% owned houses built on other people’s private land.
References
Centreal Bank of Sri Lanka. 2004. Annual Report, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo.
Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka. 2005. Listening to Those Who Lost: Survey and Analysis of Rebuilding and Relocation of Tsunami-Affected Households in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Mimeo.
Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka. 2006. Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation: Household Views on Progress and Process. Colombo: mimeo.
Jayasuriya, S., P. Steele, and D. Weerakoon. 2006. Post-Tsunami Recovery: Issues and Challenges in Sri Lanka. Tokyo: ABDI.
Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA). 2006. Revised Tsunami Housing Policy. Colombo: Presidential Secretariat.
Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN). 2005. Assistance Policy and Implementation Guidelines: Housing and Township Development. Colombo: Presidential Secretariat.
Weerakoon, D., S. Jayasuriya, N. Arunatilake, and P. Steele. 2007. Economic Challenges of Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Sri Lanka. Tokyo: ADBI.
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Arunatilake, N. (2018). Post-disaster Housing: Lessons Learnt from the 2004 Tsunami of Sri Lanka. In: Reddy, S. (eds) The Asian Tsunami and Post-Disaster Aid. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0182-7_11
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