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Detention by Non-State Armed Groups in NIACs: IHL, International Human Rights Law and the Question of the Right Authority

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International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors

Abstract

This chapter brings attention to the quite divergent consequences of dealing with the issue of detention by non-State armed groups in non-international armed conflicts under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The conventional approach to detention in international humanitarian law is that armed groups only have a de facto power, bound by humanitarian obligations. Under the laws of war, the question is partly tied to whether States themselves have the prerogative to detain under Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, a question that is far from settled. Non-State armed groups raise the added problem that they may not be recognized, or be recognized only for the purposes of endorsing humanitarian obligations. If international humanitarian law does not apply to the authority to detain, then the question falls to be resolved by international human rights law. Under the latter, there must be a solid foundation to any deprivation of freedom, and the question cannot simply be one of treating captives humanely. This chapter will suggest that in both cases a theory of non-State actors’ ‘right authority’ is missing when it comes to detaining State troops. Historically, this issue has been obscured by the fact that the right authority has been equated with statehood, but the moment may have come to rediscover how one can identify non-State actors that could be considered privileged in the international legal system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, among others, Hill-Cawthorne and Akande 2014; Milanovic 2014; Mačák 2014; Sari 2014. See also, for earlier research that is nonetheless relevant, Bellinger III and Padmanabhan 2011; and Deeks 2007.

  2. 2.

    UK Court of Appeal, Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA (Civ) 843 (Eng.) and in the Supreme Court [2017] UKSC 2.

  3. 3.

    Andrew Clapham has recently discussed the existence of ‘knock on effects’ of positions about detention in relation to States or armed groups, especially when it comes to the authority to detain. See Clapham 2017.

  4. 4.

    One may think of it, even though the terminology is a bit misleading, in terms of a jus in detentio, and a jus ad detentium.

  5. 5.

    Bilkova 2010.

  6. 6.

    See Heffes 2015; Murray 2016; Clapham 2017; and Murray 2017.

  7. 7.

    Somer 2007; and Mégret 2014.

  8. 8.

    Clapham 2017.

  9. 9.

    Murray 2017.

  10. 10.

    See, among many others, Arnold and Quénivet 2008; Tomuschat 2010; Provost 2002; Orakhelashvili 2008; Meron 1989; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2015; Droege 2007; Milanović 2009; Milanovic 2007; Doswald-Beck and Vité 1993; Kretzmer 2009; Sassòli and Olson 2008. See also Chap. 8 by Henckaerts and Wiesener in the present volume.

  11. 11.

    See also Chap. 2 by Gasser and Malzacher in the present volume.

  12. 12.

    The search for areas where the joint applicability of IHL and IHRL really makes a difference is very much one of the crucial challenges of the debate.

  13. 13.

    Rodenhäuser 2015. See also Chap. 8 by Henckaerts and Wiesener in the present volume.

  14. 14.

    For an analysis of a State’s non-legal and non-humanitarian motivations for denying non-State armed groups any status, see Steinhoff 2009.

  15. 15.

    See Chap. 2 by Bellal in the present volume.

  16. 16.

    Crawford 2007.

  17. 17.

    Watkin 2009; Bassiouni 2008; Sivakumaran 2011; Sassòli 2010; Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012; La Rosa and Wuerzner 2008; Lacroix et al. 2011; Kleffner 2011; Kaplan 2013; Hofmann 2006; Higgins 2009; Buckley 2011; Bongard 2008; Bongard and Somer 2011; Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011; and Bangerter 2011.

  18. 18.

    Heffes 2015.

  19. 19.

    ICRC 2016, paras 503–504.

  20. 20.

    Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), para 239.

  21. 21.

    Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para 16. See in particular Lord Reed (‘I have not been persuaded that there exists at present either sufficient opinio juris or a sufficiently extensive and uniform practice to establish the suggested rule of customary international law’).

  22. 22.

    There are certainly arguments to that effect, even though CA3 and AP II cannot be said to include a comprehensive regime of detention. See Goodman 2015.

  23. 23.

    There are countless examples of international law doing just that. See Akande and Hill-Cawthorne 2014. Specifically, when it comes to the issue of detention, the fundamental problem of detention by NSAGs has been described as the fact that ‘every detainee is in a situation of particular vulnerability (regardless of the character of the detaining authority), both vis-à-vis their captor and in relation to their environment’. Aeschlimann 2005, p 83. In other words, the grounds for detention matter far less than the actual humanitarian conditions of detainees––a quintessential humanitarian approach.

  24. 24.

    Mégret 2006.

  25. 25.

    The Lotus case concerned the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction but is generally remembered as standing for the rule that States do not need some special permissive rule of international law to engage in behavior that is not otherwise prohibited. Rather, the assumption is that of freedom to use their sovereignty as they please. Here, that would include the a priori power to detain members of NSAGs on their territory. PCIJ, The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgement, 7 September 1927, Series A, No. 10, para 46.

  26. 26.

    Perhaps so confusing that, from a purely textual reading, they may either ‘have gotten their cake but not eaten it’ (detention powers for States, but also for NSAGs) or ‘gotten neither their cake nor eaten it’ (no detention powers for NSAGs, but also no detention powers for States either).

  27. 27.

    Mačák 2014.

  28. 28.

    Sari 2014.

  29. 29.

    Somer 2007, p 663.

  30. 30.

    Rona 2015, p 38.

  31. 31.

    Sassòli 2011.

  32. 32.

    Heffes 2015.

  33. 33.

    See for example Sandoz et al. 1987, p 1345; Somer 2007.

  34. 34.

    Sivakumaran 2011, pp 479–480.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., p 481.

  36. 36.

    Ohlin 2015.

  37. 37.

    Note however that occasionally such accusations have been made, and that engaging with such groups on grounds other than strictly humanitarian ones may be illegal in some states. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). See Chap. 13 by Quintin and Tougas in the present volume.

  38. 38.

    See for example in jus ad bellum, Simma 1999.

  39. 39.

    In passing, one of the little remarked ironies of the reluctance to further engage with the issue of the prerogatives of NSAGs under IHL is that it could open the door to the application of IHRL to detention. It could therefore arguably bind States opposing NSAGs in NIACs even further (although not at the cost, it should be said, of recognizing such groups as belligerents). This is worth bearing in mind when thinking about the strange gambles that States engage in when developing international norms: the alternative to recognizing some sort of belligerent status to NSAGs is not necessarily a freer hand but one that may be at least substantively more constrained. This could of course be rationalized. It may be, for example, that States prefer the feigned normalcy of human rights law when dealing with their rebellious subjects than the anomalous consequences of recognizing them as belligerents because at least symbolically this shows States to be more in charge (and perhaps also more concretely avoids the invocation of the war crimes provisions of IHL which have no immediate analog in IHRL).

  40. 40.

    ECHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 16 September 2014, App. No. 29750/09.

  41. 41.

    Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence 2005.

  42. 42.

    Dormann 2012.

  43. 43.

    Under the Fourth Geneva Convention this is also a possibility in Article 78, but a challenge on human rights grounds would presumably take a different form and create distinct remedies. It is of course also possible that certain human rights guarantees would be incorporated on an ad hoc basis to the regime of detention as part of the process of ‘humanization’ of the laws of war. Hybridization between IHRL and IHL is a practical possibility as well as, in some circumstances, a normative necessity.

  44. 44.

    Rona 2015.

  45. 45.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 (ICCPR), Article 9.1.

  46. 46.

    Sassòli 2011.

  47. 47.

    For a helpful example see Murray 2016, pp 237–244.

  48. 48.

    Clapham 2006. See also Chap. 8 by Henckaerts and Wiesener, Chap. 11 by Oberleitner and Chap. 14 by Kotlik, all included in the present volume.

  49. 49.

    Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2016, p 26.

  50. 50.

    Mégret 2013.

  51. 51.

    Bilkova 2010.

  52. 52.

    Engle 2009. See also Hessbruegge 2005.

  53. 53.

    Of course, the legality of detention may be challenged under the laws of war in IACs, but only from the limited angle that the person concerned was not a combatant at the time of capture. This is a status rather than guilt determination and is therefore less protective. In NIACs, it is much less clear that one can challenge detention since the laws of war do not tell us in the first place that such a detention, whether effected by a State or non-State actor, is legal (although presumably detention of this sort should only be, by analogy with IACs, for combatants).

  54. 54.

    See Chap. 12 by Diab in the present volume.

  55. 55.

    For a recent example of such an approach, see Clapham 2017. See also Sassòli 2010.

  56. 56.

    Kreβ and Mégret 2014 and Kretzmer 2009.

  57. 57.

    Mastorodimos 2016.

  58. 58.

    Gould 2009.

  59. 59.

    Lieblich 2016.

  60. 60.

    As Kenneth Watkin put it ‘… one aspect of just war theory, fighting for a State as the “right authority” in order to have legitimacy, hangs like a dark cloud over the attempts to reach consensus on the legal regulation of non-international armed conflicts.’ Watkin 2012, pp 5–6.

  61. 61.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP II), Article 1 (NIACs are defined as involving ‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’)

  62. 62.

    Heffes 2015.

  63. 63.

    Kreβ and Mégret 2014.

  64. 64.

    Bilkova 2010.

  65. 65.

    Carpenter and Riley 2014.

  66. 66.

    Sivakumaran 2006.

  67. 67.

    Sassòli 2010.

  68. 68.

    See Chap. 15 by Heffes in the present volume.

  69. 69.

    Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012.

  70. 70.

    Ryngaert 2010.

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  1. Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

    Frédéric Mégret

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    Ezequiel Heffes

  2. Observatory of International Humanitarian Law, School of Law, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

    Marcos D. Kotlik

  3. Office of the Prosecutor, International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Arusha, Tanzania

    Manuel J. Ventura

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Mégret, F. (2020). Detention by Non-State Armed Groups in NIACs: IHL, International Human Rights Law and the Question of the Right Authority. In: Heffes, E., Kotlik, M., Ventura, M. (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-339-9_7

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