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Compliance with Humanitarian Rules on the Protection of Children by Non-State Armed Groups: The UN’s Managerial Approach

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International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors

Abstract

The framework created by the United Nations (UN) to address the situation of children affected by armed conflicts relies on a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism implemented by personnel on the ground and supervised by the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, with the endorsement of the UN Security Council. It produces information that may be employed by multiple actors and aims to ensure compliance with basic humanitarian rules and reduce grave violations suffered by children. States and non-State armed groups that are listed as violators are encouraged to engage in dialogue with UN personnel on the ground towards the adoption of action plans that will lead them to compliance. This chapter examines this framework as a predominantly managerial approach to non-compliance, highlighting its positive features as well as its shortcomings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Baghat et al. 2018; Save the Children 2018, pp 15–17.

  2. 2.

    The University of Iowa Center for Human Rights 2016, p 9.

  3. 3.

    See UN Secretary-General 2017, para 5 (stating that in 2016 alone there were at least 4,000 verified violations against children by government forces and more than 11,500 verified violations by NSAGs); and UN Secretary-General 2018, para 5 (highlighting the increase in 2017, with 6,000 verified violations by government forces and more than 15,000 by NSAGs). On the increasing amount of NIACs and NSAGs, see Bellal 2018, pp 29–31; ICRC 2018, pp 13–14.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP I), Article 77; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978 (AP II), Article 4(3); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, entered into force 2 September 1990 (CRC), Article 38; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, opened for signature 11 July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999, Articles 2 and 22.

  5. 5.

    See e.g. AP I, above n. 4, Article 77(2); AP II, above n. 4, Article 4(3)(c); CRC, above n. 4, Articles 38(2)–(3); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, opened for signature 25 May 2000, 2173 UNTS 222, entered into force 12 February 2002 (Optional Protocol), Articles 6(3) and 7(1); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, above n. 4, Articles 2 and 22(2); Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, opened for signature 17 June 1999, ILO No. 182, entered into force 19 November 2000, Articles 1 and 3. It should be noted that the age-limit for recruitment is not uniform in international law. While AP I, AP II and the CRC establish the minimum age at 15, under the Optional Protocol and the African Charter, States must ensure that persons under the age of 18 are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces, while armed groups must not recruit such persons under any circumstances.

  6. 6.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, entered into force 1 July 2002, Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii). See also Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Annex to the Agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, opened to signature 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 137, entered into force 12 April 2002, Article 4(c).

  7. 7.

    See e.g. The Paris Principles 2007; The Safe Schools Declaration 2015; The Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 2017.

  8. 8.

    UN General Assembly 1996b, para 35. The General Assembly’s recommendation followed the publication of ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, a report by Graça Machel—an independent expert appointed in 1994 by the Secretary-General pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 48/157—which took note of a recommendation by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. See UN General Assembly 1993; UN General Assembly 1996a.

  9. 9.

    UN Security Council 2004, para 5(a).

  10. 10.

    UN Security Council 2005, para 3.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., para 8.

  12. 12.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 59.

  13. 13.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 68.

  14. 14.

    UN Security Council 2005, para 2(a).

  15. 15.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 67.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., para 59.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2003, para 4; UN Security Council 2004, para 5; UN Security Council 2005, para 7.

  18. 18.

    UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2006a, p 4; UN Security Council 2006.

  19. 19.

    The analysis of managerial approaches throughout this chapter follows Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995.

  20. 20.

    See Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 3.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., pp 3–22.

  22. 22.

    Happold 2010, pp 373–375.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., pp 373–374.

  24. 24.

    UN Security Council 2005, preamble; UN Security Council 2009, preamble; UN Security Council 2011, preamble; UN Security Council 2012, preamble; UN Security Council 2015, preamble.

  25. 25.

    Klosterman 2015, p 327.

  26. 26.

    Happold 2010, p 368.

  27. 27.

    See e.g. UN Secretary-General 2002, paras 30–31; UN Secretary-General 2005, paras 69–73; UN Secretary-General 2007, para 8; UN Secretary-General 2009, para 1; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 2; UN Secretary-General 2011, para 2.

  28. 28.

    UN Secretary-General 2010, para 173.

  29. 29.

    UN Security Council 2011, preamble; UN Security Council 2014, preamble, para 5; UN Security Council 2015, preamble; UN Security Council 2018, preamble.

  30. 30.

    UN Security Council 2005, paras 1, 2(a), 5, 15; UN Security Council 2009, paras 1, 3, 5; UN Security Council 2011, paras 1, 3, 4, 6, 11; UN Security Council 2012, para 2; UN Security Council 2014, paras 1, 17, 18; UN Security Council 2015, paras 1, 3, 4, 7; UN Security Council 2018, paras 1, 18.

  31. 31.

    ICRC n.d. Customary IHL Database, rules 1 and 7.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., rules 96 and 98.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., rule 55.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., rules 93 and 135.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., rules 136 and 137. See also above n. 5.

  36. 36.

    Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 2013, pp 11–12. It should be noted that, consequently, the criteria employed to list parties as violators of the prohibition on the recruitment and use of child soldiers may vary from State to State. The Secretary-General applies the 15 years-old limit as the minimum international standard to which all States and NSAGs are held. In States that have ratified the Optional Protocol, however, both States and NSAGs are held to the 18 years-old limit. See UN Secretary-General 2002, paras 30–31. That is how the reference to the ‘applicable law’ in the context of the recruitment and use of child soldiers should be understood in the Secretary-General’s reports. See above n. 27–30, and accompanying text. Notwithstanding, the SRSG, in cooperation with UNICEF and UNHCR conducted a global campaign (which ended in 2012) called ‘Zero under 18’, encouraging ratification of the Optional Protocol.

  37. 37.

    See e.g. ICRC 2016, paras 503–505; Sandoz et al. 1987, p 1372, fn 18; Moir 2002, pp 65–67; Zegveld 2002, p 152; Sassòli 2003, p 6.

  38. 38.

    Pejic 2011, pp 197–198; Moir 2002, pp 52–88; Somer 2007, p 661; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras 96–126.

  39. 39.

    See ICRC 2016, paras 507–508.

  40. 40.

    See Pictet 1952, p 51; Pictet 1960, p 34.

  41. 41.

    See e.g. Henckaerts 2003, pp 126–127; Moir 2002, pp 54–56; Somer 2007, p 661; Cassese 1981, pp 429–430; d’Aspremont and de Hemptinne 2012, pp 98–99; Heffes and Kotlik 2014, pp 1202–1203.

  42. 42.

    See Henckaerts 2003, pp 126–127; Moir 2002, pp 54–55; Heffes and Kotlik 2014, p 1202. In this context, ownership of rules may be understood as ‘the capacity and willingness of actors engaged in armed conflicts to set and/or take responsibility for the respect of norms intended to protect civilians as well as other humanitarian norms applicable in armed conflict’. Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011, p 177. See also Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2011, p 6; Saul 2016, p 5; Kassoti 2016, p 8.

  43. 43.

    Ryngaert 2011, pp 285, 288–289.

  44. 44.

    See Fortin 2017, pp 152–173, 209–284, 323–356; Murray 2016, pp 157–202; Henckaerts and Wiesener, Chap. 8. Although further exploration of this issue would exceed the scope of the chapter, it is particularly relevant when applying the Optional Protocol to NSAGs. See above n. 36 and accompanying text.

  45. 45.

    See generally Kooijmans 1998; Zegveld 2002, p 160; Bolani 2003, pp 430–433; Miretzki 2009; Heffes et al. 2015, pp 42–43.

  46. 46.

    Heffes et al. 2015, pp 47–50.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., pp 60–65.

  48. 48.

    See ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Doc 2010 General List No 141 (Advisory Opinion on Kosovo), paras 58–59, 85–120 (especially paras 116–118 examining whether UN Security Council resolution 1244 addressed actors other than States and international organizations).

  49. 49.

    See UN Security Council 2005, preamble; UN Security Council 2009, para 13, preamble; UN Security Council 2011, para 18, preamble; UN Security Council 2012, preamble; UN Security Council 2014, preamble; UN Security Council 2015, preamble; UN Security Council 2018, preamble.

  50. 50.

    ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p 53, para 114. See also Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, above n. 48, para 117 (affirming the relevance of such an approach not only to determine the binding effect of UN Security Council resolutions, but also to identify for whom they intend to create binding legal obligations) and para 94 (explaining that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may provide guidance to interpret UN Security Council resolutions, but that other factors must be taken into account, including statements by UN Security Council members at the time of adoption, other UN Security Council resolutions on the same issue, and the subsequent practice of relevant UN organs and of States affected by those resolutions). In that case, however, the interpretation was rather aimed at establishing the content and addressees of the binding legal obligations created by resolution 1244 (1999), since the ICJ noted that the resolution was expressly adopted on the basis of Chapter VII.

  51. 51.

    Field 2013, pp 130–131.

  52. 52.

    See below Sect. 14.4.2.

  53. 53.

    Field 2013, p 132.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., pp 133–134.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., p 134. In this regard, Field adopts the theoretical framework devised by Abbot and Snidal, which blurs the distinction between hard law and soft law by placing both categories at opposite ends of a continuum, where three dimensions—obligation, precision, delegation—determine whether a particular arrangement is closer to one or the other. See Abbot and Snidal 2000, pp 421–424.

  57. 57.

    Field 2013, p 135.

  58. 58.

    Happold 2010, p 375.

  59. 59.

    See Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 10; Happold 2010, p 375.

  60. 60.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 74.

  61. 61.

    See Sassòli 2010, p 30; ICRC 2008, p 19; Tougas and Quintin, Chap. 13; Heffes, Chap. 15.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Sivakumaran 2011, pp 465–469; Bangerter 2012, pp 4–25; Sivakumaran 2012, pp 107–152; Heffes and Kotlik 2014; Saul 2016, pp 9–15.

  63. 63.

    Sivakumaran 2011, p 464.

  64. 64.

    See Sivakumaran 2012, pp 315–316.

  65. 65.

    Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 1998, Part III, Articles 2(24), 10, Part IV, Article 10.

  66. 66.

    Geneva Call n.d. Child Protection; Geneva Call 2017, pp 19–20; Heffes, Chap. 15.

  67. 67.

    UN Secretary-General 2003, paras 73–75.

  68. 68.

    See Bangerter 2011, pp 354, 368–380 (mentioning the recruitment of children as a conduct that may be rationally explained); Wood 2015, p 15; La Rosa and Wuerzner 2008, p 331; Saul 2016, pp 4–6.

  69. 69.

    See ICRC 2007, p 23; Saul 2016, p 6.

  70. 70.

    See Bangerter 2011, pp 358–368; Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 2003.

  71. 71.

    See Bangerter 2011, pp 357, 369–370, 380–382; Geneva Call 2017, p 13.

  72. 72.

    See Henckaerts 2003, pp 126–129; Moir 2002, pp 54–55; Bongard and Somer 2011, p 685.

  73. 73.

    ICRC 2003, pp 20–21; Bangerter 2011, p 357.

  74. 74.

    Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011, p 177.

  75. 75.

    See ICRC 2018, pp 13–15, 20–21.

  76. 76.

    See Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, pp 7–18.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p 7.

  78. 78.

    ICRC 2018, pp 19, 64.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., p 22.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., pp 23–24.

  81. 81.

    UN Secretary-General 2014, para 15.

  82. 82.

    ICRC 2018, p 46.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., pp 50, 57. See also UN Secretary-General 2018, para 17, highlighting the need for ‘closer strategic and operational partnerships with regional and subregional actors … to address the challenge of sustaining peace.’

  84. 84.

    Happold 2010, p 371.

  85. 85.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 77.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Klosterman 2015, p 335.

  88. 88.

    See Jo 2015, p 5 (stating that the ‘central thesis of the book is that legitimacy-seeking rebel groups are more likely to comply with international law than legitimacy-indifferent groups’). See pp 150–153 for an explanation of how legitimacy considerations may have an impact upon the use of child soldiers.

  89. 89.

    Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, p 7.

  90. 90.

    Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011, pp 193–194.

  91. 91.

    See Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia 2015, p 5.

  92. 92.

    Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 25.

  93. 93.

    See ibid., p 22.

  94. 94.

    See ibid., pp 22–27.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., p 25.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., pp 22–24.

  97. 97.

    See UN Secretary-General 2005, paras 79–83; UN Security Council 2005, para 2(b); Happold 2010, p 366.

  98. 98.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 83.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., para 86.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., paras 92–94. Since 2017, the lists of offending parties distinguish between those that put in place measures during the reporting period aimed at improving the protection of children, and those who did not. UN Secretary-General 2017, pp 39–41; UN Secretary-General 2018, pp 40–42.

  101. 101.

    See Save the Children 2018, p 35.

  102. 102.

    Baghat et al. 2018, p 2.

  103. 103.

    Save the Children 2018, p 18.

  104. 104.

    See ICRC 2018, p 20 (generally referring to tracking patterns of violence, although not specifically to the MRM).

  105. 105.

    See UN General Assembly 2017, para 33.

  106. 106.

    Karenni National Progressive Party 2007; Karenni National Progressive Party 2008; Karenni National Progressive Party 2009.

  107. 107.

    ICRC 2018, p 66.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., pp 47, 49–50, 57–58, 60. See also Cismas and Heffes 2017 (focusing on religious actors).

  109. 109.

    ICRC 2018, p 65.

  110. 110.

    Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 24.

  111. 111.

    Ibid.

  112. 112.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, paras 98–99, 107; UN Security Council 2005, para 6.

  113. 113.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, paras 108–109.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., paras 117–118.

  115. 115.

    Ibid., paras 121–123.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., paras 124–132. See Oberleitner, Chap. 11.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., paras 133–135.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., paras 136–137.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., para 110.

  120. 120.

    See above n. 49.

  121. 121.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, paras 111–114.

  122. 122.

    UN Security Council 2001, para 16. In his first report, the Secretary-General only listed parties to conflicts which were already situations on the UN Security Council’s agenda. Nowadays, parties to conflicts on the UN Security Council’s agenda are listed in Annex I to the Secretary-General’s reports, while parties to other conflicts are listed in Annex II to the reports.

  123. 123.

    Happold 2010, p 367.

  124. 124.

    UN Security Council 2009, para 3; UN Security Council 2011, para 3; UN Security Council 2015, para 3.

  125. 125.

    See e.g. UN Secretary-General 2005, para 82.

  126. 126.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2003, para 4; UN Security Council 2004, para 5; UN Security Council 2005, para 7.

  127. 127.

    Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict n.d. Action Plans.

  128. 128.

    Ibid.

  129. 129.

    MILF and UN in the Philippines 2009, para 2.1.a. The BIAF is the armed wing of the MILF, although both names are used interchangeably in some literature and news reports.

  130. 130.

    Justice and Equality Movement 2012, pp 2–4.

  131. 131.

    See Sassòli 2010, p 13.

  132. 132.

    See Ryngaert 2011, p 288.

  133. 133.

    See Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 2003, pp 203–204; ICRC 2008, p 19; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 179 (explaining that action plans should include official command orders issued through the chain of command specifying a commitment to halt violations and to take disciplinary measures against perpetrators).

  134. 134.

    MILF and UN in the Philippines 2009, paras 2.1.c, 2.1.d, 2.1.f, 2.1.i, 3.1. The Supplemental General Order for General Order Nos. 1 & 2 issued by the MILF in support of the action plan can be found as an annex to the same document. The General Order clarifies the policy on the non-recruitment of children, establishes sanctions for non-compliance, and a procedure for handling children found within their ranks.

  135. 135.

    Justice and Equality Movement 2012, pp 4–6.

  136. 136.

    Bangerter 2012, p 3.

  137. 137.

    See Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 2003, pp 193–195, 203–204.

  138. 138.

    ICRC 2018, p 38.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., p 55.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., p 56.

  141. 141.

    See Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 2003, p 203.

  142. 142.

    ICRC 2018, p 65.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., p 25.

  144. 144.

    Ibid.

  145. 145.

    Sivakumaran 2012, p 112.

  146. 146.

    See e.g. UN Secretary-General 2007, para 17; UN Secretary-General 2009, para 9; UN Secretary-General 2010, paras 178–180.

  147. 147.

    MILF and UN in the Philippines 2009, para 2.1.g.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., paras 5.1, 5.2.

  149. 149.

    Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict n.d. Action Plans.

  150. 150.

    Jo 2015, p 167.

  151. 151.

    Justice and Equality Movement 2012, pp 5, 7.

  152. 152.

    Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict n.d. Action Plans.

  153. 153.

    Ibid. In some cases, delisting is also related to the disappearance of the NSAG as such, for example, ‘in Colombia, following the transformation of FARC-EP into a political party, the group ended all child recruitment, released 135 children and has been delisted for ceasing recruitment and use.’ UN Secretary-General 2018, para 263.

  154. 154.

    See Happold 2010, p 362.

  155. 155.

    See Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 26.

  156. 156.

    See ibid., pp 27–28.

  157. 157.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 77.

  158. 158.

    See Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 25.

  159. 159.

    See Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard 2003, pp 192, 203–204.

  160. 160.

    See ICRC 2003, pp 20–21; Bangerter 2011, pp 357, 383–384.

  161. 161.

    See Geneva Call 2017, p 19.

  162. 162.

    See generally La Rosa and Wuerzner 2008, pp 333–334 (highlighting the importance of dissemination and training).

  163. 163.

    MILF and UN in the Philippines 2009, paras 2.1.e, 2.1.f, 2.1.i, 2.1.j, 2.2.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., para 2.3.

  165. 165.

    Justice and Equality Movement 2012, pp 5–6.

  166. 166.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2005, para 17; UN Security Council 2014, para 14; UN Security Council 2015, para 12. See also UN Secretary-General 2009, para 174; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 191; UN Secretary-General 2016, paras 219, 221; UN Secretary-General 2017, para 238.

  167. 167.

    See Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, pp 250–253.

  168. 168.

    UN Secretary-General 2005, para 81.

  169. 169.

    ICRC 2018, pp 42–43.

  170. 170.

    Save the Children 2018, p 38.

  171. 171.

    See e.g. UN Security Council 2005, paras 12, 18; UN Security Council 2009, para 11; UN Security Council 2011, para 14; UN Security Council 2014, paras 20, 24; UN Security Council 2015, para 15; UN Security Council 2018, paras 33, 36; UN Secretary-General 2006, paras 130–133; UN Secretary-General 2007, paras 153–154, 165; UN Secretary-General 2009, paras 151–153; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 194; UN Secretary-General 2011, para 219; UN Secretary-General 2012, para 241; UN Secretary-General 2013, para 211; UN Secretary-General 2014, paras 20, 213; UN Secretary-General 2015, para 274; UN Secretary-General 2016, para 224; UN Secretary-General 2017, para 242; UN Secretary-General 2018, para 258.

  172. 172.

    Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 271.

  173. 173.

    See e.g. UN Secretary-General 2006, para 119.

  174. 174.

    See UN Security Council 2005, para 10; UN Security Council 2009, para 8; UN Security Council 2011, para 12; UN Secretary-General 2009, para 149.

  175. 175.

    See d’Aspremont 2011, p 63; Klabbers 2015, p 13.

  176. 176.

    See White 2011, pp 298–300, 302–303; Klabbers 2015, p 13.

  177. 177.

    ICRC 2018, p 67.

  178. 178.

    UN Secretary-General 2012, para 238.

  179. 179.

    See UN Secretary-General 2006, para 136; UN Secretary-General 2007, paras 150, 170; UN Security Council 2009, paras 13–14; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 185; UN Secretary-General 2011, para 223; UN Secretary-General 2012, para 238; UN Secretary-General 2013, para 205; UN Security Council 2014, para 15; UN Secretary-General 2014, para 207; UN Secretary-General 2016, paras 219, 221; UN Secretary-General 2017, paras 238, 242; UN Secretary-General 2018, para 259.

  180. 180.

    UN Security Council 2018, para 37.

  181. 181.

    UN Security Council 2005, paras 2(b), 2(d).

  182. 182.

    See Happold 2010, pp 365–366.

  183. 183.

    UN Secretary-General 2007, para 150; UN Secretary-General 2012, paras 113, 118, 163; UN Secretary-General 2014, para 204; UN Secretary-General 2015, paras 178, 186, 261.

  184. 184.

    See UN Secretary-General 2007, para 158; UN Secretary-General 2009, para 147; UN Secretary-General 2010, para 15; UN Secretary-General 2011, para 29; UN Secretary-General 2012, paras 77, 192; UN Secretary-General 2016, para 111; UN Secretary-General 2017, para 132; UN Secretary-General 2018, paras 134, 139, 142; Geneva Call 2017, p 19.

  185. 185.

    UN Secretary-General 2018, para 9.

  186. 186.

    See Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, pp 132–137.

  187. 187.

    See 18 U.S. Code § 23339A; Supreme Court of the United States, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 21 June 2010, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). See also Acquaviva 2010.

  188. 188.

    UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2006b, para V.

  189. 189.

    Ibid., para VI.

  190. 190.

    Klosterman, p 346.

  191. 191.

    UN Security Council 2006.

  192. 192.

    UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2006b, para VII.

  193. 193.

    See Happold 2010, pp 366–367, 375.

  194. 194.

    Klosterman, p 348.

  195. 195.

    Ibid., p 370.

  196. 196.

    See UN Security Council 2004, para 5(c); UN Security Council 2005, para 9; UN Security Council 2012, para 3(b); UN Security Council 2014, para 10; UN Security Council 2018, para 32.

  197. 197.

    Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 2.

  198. 198.

    See Geneva Call 2017, pp 20–21.

  199. 199.

    See e.g. Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur 2004 (creating a commission in charge of examining complaints related to possible violations of the cease fire); Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 2002 (creating the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission); Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 2002 (reactivating a Joint Security Committee capable of sanctioning violations of the agreement).

  200. 200.

    UN Security Council 2005, para 9.

  201. 201.

    See Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia 2015, pp 12–13.

  202. 202.

    See UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2015, para 16; UN General Assembly 2016, para 65; UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2017a, para 10; UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2017b, para 10.

  203. 203.

    Koller and Eckenfels-Garcia 2015, pp 6–7.

  204. 204.

    Ibid., 8–12; UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2014, para 6(n); UN Working Group of the Security Council on children and armed conflict 2016, para 11(c).

  205. 205.

    See Save the Children 2018, p 36.

  206. 206.

    See UN Secretary-General 2013, para 12.

  207. 207.

    Happold 2010, p 370.

  208. 208.

    Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict n.d. Action Plans.

  209. 209.

    Klosterman 2015, p 338.

  210. 210.

    See UN Secretary-General 2012, para 220; Field 2013, p 143; Happold 2010, p 363.

  211. 211.

    Klosterman 2015, p 338.

  212. 212.

    Save the Children 2018, p 10.

  213. 213.

    Kooijmans 1998, p 339.

  214. 214.

    See Bongard and Somer 2011, p 675.

  215. 215.

    See Roberts and Sivakumaran 2012, pp 134–137.

  216. 216.

    Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995, p 25.

  217. 217.

    Ibid., pp 25–26.

  218. 218.

    On the functions of decision-making processes, see Chen 2015, pp 17–18; McDougal 1956, p 57.

  219. 219.

    See Save the Children 2018, p 36.

  220. 220.

    Bangerter 2012, p 4; ICRC 2018, p 64.

  221. 221.

    See ICRC 2018, p 54.

  222. 222.

    Ibid., pp 64–65.

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Kotlik, M.D. (2020). Compliance with Humanitarian Rules on the Protection of Children by Non-State Armed Groups: The UN’s Managerial Approach. In: Heffes, E., Kotlik, M., Ventura, M. (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-339-9_14

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