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Perspectives on the Intervention of the ICC in Palestine

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Palestine and the International Criminal Court

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 21))

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Abstract

Peace and justice are no longer viewed as mutually exclusive. Establishing sustainable peace requires addressing injustices and combatting the culture of impunity. The proper application and sequencing of transitional justice tools enable peace and justice to augment each other. This chapter discusses this inherent connection between peace and justice in light of the intervention of the International Criminal Court in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is difficult to categorically measure and conclusively assert the impact the International Criminal Court’s investigations and prosecutions could have on the conflict before the Court finalizes the intervention. In comparison with other situations the Court has dealt with, this chapter addresses potential impacts of the Court’s intervention on combating impunity, the statehood question of Palestine, the stability of the two nations and the credibility of the Court itself. Taking note of the often raised claim that prosecution of alleged crimes committed in the conflict would disrupt peace settlements, the chapter also examines the pros and cons of establishing accountability on peace efforts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Transitional justice refers to various judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to deal with human rights violations. Although transitional justice normally refers to those means to establish truth, justice and reconciliation in post-conflict situations, its mechanisms are also applicable before transition. In this sense, the transition refers to the State’s or the chosen organization’s recognition of the gross violations and application of the transitional justice mechanisms to redress the injustices—rather than transition in the sense of regime change. See Stan and Nedelsky 2013, p. xli; UNSC 2011, para 17.

  2. 2.

    Be it in the national and international context, establishing accountability has been used as one of the tools of transitional justice since the 1990s. See Porter 2015, pp. 10–18; Stan and Nedelsky 2013, p. 27.

  3. 3.

    Corradetti et al. 2015, pp. 59 et seq.; Dezalay 2012, p. 79; Olsen 2017, p. 153; Sriram et al. 2013.

  4. 4.

    Hayner 2009, pp. 5–8; Rodman 2014, p. 20; Kritz 1995, pp. xxi–xxvi.

  5. 5.

    Paragraph 3, Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute). See also Méndez and Kelley 2015, p. 479.

  6. 6.

    See Ambos et al. 2009, p. v; Shimko 2016, p. 235; Stegmiller 2011, p. 393.

  7. 7.

    Kersten 2016, p. 3. See also Olasolo 2005, p. 39.

  8. 8.

    The intervention in the DRC, Uganda, the CAR and Mali are the result of self-referral by the respective States and started in 2004, 2003, 2004 and 2012, respectively. On the other hand, the situations in Darfur in 2005 and Libya in 2011 were the results of Security Council referrals. See Mendes 2010, pp. 132–133; Kersten 2016, pp. 5–6.

  9. 9.

    For an overview of the various views on the intervention of the Court in Palestine, see M. Masri et al., Palestine and the ICC, Middle East Research and Information Project, 8 January 2015, https://www.merip.org/palestine-icc (accessed 20 May 2017), items 1–4.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Materu 2015, pp. 254–255.

  12. 12.

    Mendes 2010, pp. 135 et seq.; Nicholas 2015, pp. 41–42.

  13. 13.

    Kersten 2016, p. 12.

  14. 14.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 26.

  15. 15.

    Rome Statute, above n. 5, Preamble, paras 3–4.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., Article 17.

  17. 17.

    Kersten 2016, pp. 185, 189.

  18. 18.

    Burke-White 2005, p. 565; Rodman 2014, p. 14.

  19. 19.

    M. Kersten, The ICC and its impact: more known unknowns, OpenGlobalRights, 5 November 2014, https://www.openglobalrights.org/icc-and-its-impact-more-known-unknowns/ (accessed 20 May 2017).

  20. 20.

    International Military Tribunal, United States et al. v. Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al., Judgment, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 1, p. 223.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Szekely 2014, pp. 103 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Said 1995, p. 143.

  24. 24.

    Lindenmann 2007, p. 327.

  25. 25.

    Ralston and Finnin 2008, p. 48.

  26. 26.

    Lindenmann 2007, p. 325.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., p. 319.

  28. 28.

    Unger and Wierda 2009, p. 274.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., pp. 274–275.

  30. 30.

    Rome Statute, above n. 5, Articles 54(1)(b) and 68; OTP 2007, p. 6.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 5; Mnookin 2012, p. 154.

  32. 32.

    OTP 2007, pp. 5–6.

  33. 33.

    Stegmiller 2011, p. 384.

  34. 34.

    Masri et al. 2015, above n. 9; Stegmiller 2011, p. 386.

  35. 35.

    Victims of conflict have shown different priorities than justice, for instance, in the Uganda Situation. See Pham et al. 2007, pp. 7 et seq.; Stegmiller 2011, p. 386.

  36. 36.

    The cost of pursuing justice through the ICC is higher for the Palestinian side. The US has warned the PLO that bringing cases before international Courts would result in closing PLO’s office in the US, end of foreign aid to Palestine and the possible restoring of the PLO into the terrorist groups list. See Kittrie 2016, p. 209; Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Threatens ‘Severe Steps’ if Leaders Sue Israel in World Court, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-1.769034 (accessed 2 February 2017).

  37. 37.

    Sriram 2004, p. 26.

  38. 38.

    That was evidenced by the temporal scope provided in the ad hoc declaration and the fact that the declaration was lodged immediately after Palestine’s UN bid in the Security Council failed to accrue the necessary votes. Another instance is where the threat of joining the ICC was used for a negotiation in Cairo to obtain compromises from Israel during Operation Protective Edge. See J. Borger and I. Black, Palestinian leaders poised to join ICC in order to pursue Israel for war crimes, The Guardian, 5 August 2014; Kittrie 2016, pp. 210–211; C. McGreal, Palestinians warn: back UN statehood bid or risk boosting Hamas, The Guardian, 27 November 2012; J. Reed, Palestinians push for UN deadline on Israeli withdrawal, Financial Times, 16 December 2014.

  39. 39.

    D. Spiegelfeld, Can Kerry keep the Palestinians out of the ICC? The Daily Beast, 27 March 2013.

  40. 40.

    BBC News, Will ICC Membership Help or Hinder the Palestinians’ Cause? 1 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30744701 (accessed 31 May 2015). See Kontorovich 2014. See also Kittrie 2016, pp. 209–220.

  41. 41.

    B. Lynfield, Zoabi Offers to Help the ICC Indict Netanyahu over Settlement Law, Jerusalem Post, 17 February 2017.

  42. 42.

    This is established in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR. See, for instance, the following ICTY cases: Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, 18 December 2003, IT-94-2-S, para 140; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Judgement, 14 January 2000, IT-95-16-T, para 848; Prosecutor v. Dlacić et al., Judgment, 16 November 1998, IT-96-21-T (Dlacić et al. 1998), paras 1231–1234; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement, 24 December 1996, IT-96-22-T, para 64; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgement, 10 December 1998, IT-95-17/1-T, para 288. For ICTR cases, see the following: Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, 4 September 1998, ICTR 97-23-S, para 28; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sentence, 2 October 1998, ICTR-96-4-S, para 19; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Sentence, 5 February 1999, ICTR-98-39-S, para 20; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence, 6 December 1999, ICTR-96-3-T, para 456; Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 2000, ICTR-96-13-T, para 986. See also Werle and Jessberger 2014, pp. 36–37.

  43. 43.

    ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest Article 58, 10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-8, paras 54, 60. See also Vinjamuri 2015, p. 16; Van der Wilt 2010, pp. 52 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Dlacić et al. 1998, above n. 42, paras 1231–1234; A. Walen, Retributive justice, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/ (accessed 30 September 2016), items 1–2; Werle and Jessberger 2014, pp. 36–37; Van der Wilt 2010, p. 51.

  45. 45.

    Special Court of Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghakay Taylor, Sentencing Judgment, 30 May 2012, SCSL-03-01-T, para 13; ICTY, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadić, 26 January 2000, IT-94-1-A, paras 48–56; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgment, 24 March 2000, IT-95-14/1-A, para 185.

  46. 46.

    Kersten 2016, p. 26.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Schabas 2011a, p. 61.

  49. 49.

    Kelley and Méndez 2015, p. 489.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Dancy et al. 2015; Kelley and Méndez 2015, pp. 490–491.

  52. 52.

    Ibid. See also Dancy et al. 2015.

  53. 53.

    Hayner 2009, p. 17.

  54. 54.

    Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 74.

  55. 55.

    UNHRC 2009, para 1966; Azarova 2013, p. 260.

  56. 56.

    After Palestine made an ad hoc declaration, in particular after 2015, around 15,300 acres of the West Bank was declared Israeli State land, which is reportedly one of the largest land appropriations since 2005. Between January and August 2016, 2,623 new units are planned to be built in the occupied territories. In 2015 and 2016, respectively, around 688 and 889 Palestinians were displaced due to house demolitions. See OTP 2016, pp. 29–30.

  57. 57.

    Regarding the increase in ‘lone wolf’ attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem see Y. Bob, Intel report: West Bank terror stays heated, Gaza rockets quietest year, The Jerusalem Post, 05 February 2017.

  58. 58.

    UNHRC 2009, para 1964.

  59. 59.

    Rothe and Collins 2013, p. 195.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 196.

  61. 61.

    B. Ravid, Netanyahu: security blockade on Gaza will only get stronger, Haaretz, 6 February 2017; G. Sher and D. Wolf, Recognizing that Israel is not an occupying power in Gaza is good for everyone, War on the Rocks, 8 July 2016.

  62. 62.

    Rothe and Collins have also argued similarly regarding the factors that affect the individual behavior in committing crimes and the ideologies justifying such acts. See Rothe and Collins 2013, p. 196.

  63. 63.

    Jo and Simmons 2014, pp. 12–15.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  66. 66.

    Kittrie 2016, pp. 215 et seq.

  67. 67.

    Bob 2017, above n. 57.

  68. 68.

    Azarova and Weill 2012, pp. 934–935; Kleffner 2008, p. 288; Stone 2015, p. 288.

  69. 69.

    Schabas 2011b, p. 155.

  70. 70.

    ASP 2011. See also Azarova and Weill 2012, pp. 934–935. See also Mendes 2010, p. 133.

  71. 71.

    Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) of 26 June 2002.

  72. 72.

    Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 as amended by Judicial Matters Amendment Act 22 of 2005.

  73. 73.

    Werle and Jessberger 2014, pp. 128 et seq.

  74. 74.

    Wegner 2015, p. 30. See also Dancy et al. 2015.

  75. 75.

    DeGuzman 2012, pp. 54–55.

  76. 76.

    The principle of complementarity recognizes that national criminal jurisdiction is both the right and duty of a sovereign State. See OTP 2003, p. 5. See also Schabas 2011b, p. 156.

  77. 77.

    Jo and Simmons 2014, p. 18.

  78. 78.

    Stahn 2010, p. 678.

  79. 79.

    Mnookin 2012, p. 156.

  80. 80.

    Human Rights Watch 2009, pp. 102–103; Nouwen 2013, pp. 276 et seq.

  81. 81.

    UNHRC 2009, paras 1970–1971.

  82. 82.

    K. Heller, Israel’s changes in response to the Goldstone Report, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/04/17/israels-changes-in-response-to-the-goldstone-report/ (accessed 30 November 2016).

  83. 83.

    Turkel Commission 2013, pp. 425 et seq. See also Weill 2012, p. 110.

  84. 84.

    UNHRC 2015, para 610; Israeli human rights organizations B’Tselem and Yesh Din: Israel is unwilling to investigate harm caused to Palestinians http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20140905_failure_to_investigate (accessed 21 March 2016).

  85. 85.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 18.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Kittrie 2016, pp. 210–211.

  88. 88.

    Collins 2016, p. 149; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FM Lieberman: Security Council should deal with world threats, not Palestinian gimmicks, 18 December 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/FM-Liberman-Security-Council-should-deal-with-world-threats,-not-Palestinian-gimmicks-18-Dec-2014.aspx (accessed 17 November 2016).

  89. 89.

    Kelman 2007, p. 287; Oberschall 2007, pp. 142–143. See also A. Ben-Meir, Why have past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations failed? The World Post, 18 November 2015; and BBC News, History of Mid-East peace talks, 29 July 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745 (access 31 May 2017).

  90. 90.

    Huber and Kamel 2015, pp. 2 et seq.; Kearney and Reynolds 2013, p. 420.

  91. 91.

    Huber and Kamel 2015, p. 13.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    Kontorovich 2014; Kittrie 2016, pp. 210–212.

  94. 94.

    Grono and O’Brien 2008, p. 13.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Kersten 2016, p. 13.

  97. 97.

    Mendes 2010, pp. 132–133; Wegner 2015, pp. 288–289.

  98. 98.

    Méndez and Kelley 2015, pp. 482–484; Unger and Wierda 2009, p. 265.

  99. 99.

    Méndez and Kelley 2015, p. 484.

  100. 100.

    Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 28.

  101. 101.

    Vinjamuri 2015, pp. 16–17.

  102. 102.

    It has to be noted that, in the Darfur case, although the ICC intervention helped to revive the mediation, the marginalizing effect of the indictment did not last in the domestic political arena as the indicted incumbent president run for office and succeeded. See Méndez and Kelley 2015, p. 488; and Vinjamuri 2015, p. 17. See also Nouwen 2013, pp. 276 et seq.

  103. 103.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 16; Hayner 2009, p. 17; Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 28.

  104. 104.

    Hayner 2009, p. 17.

  105. 105.

    Azarova 2013, p. 260.

  106. 106.

    M. Kersten, The ICC in Palestine: changing the narrative, rattling the status quo, 7 April 2015, https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/07/the-icc-in-palestine-changing-the-narrative-rattling-the-status-quo/ (accessed 15 November 2016).

  107. 107.

    J. Hudson and C. Lynch, From Tel Aviv to Turtle Bay, Foreign Policy, 18 March 2015; M. Kersten, Palestine and the ICC: a piece of justice or a peace for justice? 1 April 2015, https://justicehub.org/article/palestine-and-icc-piece-justice-or-peace-justice (accessed 20 January 2017).

  108. 108.

    Kersten 2015, above n. 107.

  109. 109.

    Kersten 2016, pp. 185, 189.

  110. 110.

    This was one of the justifications given by the National Transitional Council of Libya to reject negotiations with Gaddafi. However, this does not mean that peace deals would have been made had it not been for the intervention of the ICC. Other extraneous factors have also played a significant role. See ibid., p. 191.

  111. 111.

    Guembe and Olea 2006, p. 121.

  112. 112.

    The practice of granting amnesties and pardons to perpetrators who committed gross human right violations is also no longer in line with international legal standards. The precedents of Inter-American Court and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights establish this practice. See, for instance, the following IACHR judgments: Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, 26 September 2006, IACHR Series C No. 154; Barrios Altos v. Peru, 30 November 2001, IACHR Series C No 87; “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, 24 November 2009.

  113. 113.

    As witnessed in Sierra Leone and the DRC, the non-recognition of amnesties and pardons has a direct impact on peace deals. See Guembe and Olea 2006, p. 121; Hayner 2009, p. 8.

  114. 114.

    Kersten 2014, above n. 19.

  115. 115.

    BBC News, History of Mid-East peace talks, 29 July 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745 (accessed 31 May 2017).

  116. 116.

    Collins 2016, p. 149.

  117. 117.

    Kelley and Méndez 2015, p. 488.

  118. 118.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 21.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., p. 17.

  120. 120.

    Kersten 2016, p. 27.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    The Preliminary Examination Reports of 2015 and 2016 did not cover the blockade as a potentially prosecutable case. See OTP 2015, pp. 11 et seq.; OTP 2016, pp. 25 et seq.

  123. 123.

    Retaliation to the Court’s action, albeit in a different context, has been witnessed following the issuance of an arrest warrant against the incumbent head of State of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir. Subsequent to the campaign of shaming and marginalizing that followed the arrest warrant for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, around 13 humanitarian agencies were expelled from Sudan despite the dire need of the victims of violence and it risked a violent cycle of conflict. See Kersten 2016, p. 28.

  124. 124.

    Collins 2016, p. 149; S. Maupas, Palestine engages International Criminal Court as last resort, JusticeInfo.Net, 26 June 2015, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/925-palestine-engages-international-criminal-court-as-last-resort.html (accessed 20 May 2017).

  125. 125.

    Chesterman 2001, p. 8; Kersten 2016, p. 28; Peskin 2008, p. 36.

  126. 126.

    Mendes 2010, p. 133.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., pp. 132–133.

  128. 128.

    The price of including alleged perpetrators in administration and government positions, for instance in Afghanistan, the DRC and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lack of effective prosecution in Sudan proved counterproductive. See Human Rights Watch 2009, pp. 3, 35, 43, 54 and 68 et seq.

  129. 129.

    Kersten 2016, p. 33.

  130. 130.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 20; Kersten 2016, p. 34.

  131. 131.

    Rodman 2014, p. 3.

  132. 132.

    Kersten 2016, pp. 35–36.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., pp. 168–172.

  134. 134.

    Mnookin 2012, p. 151.

  135. 135.

    See OTP 2016.

  136. 136.

    Materu provided surveys conducted in relation to the Kenyan situation before the ICC. The public opinion poll of Kenyans indicates that the support for the Court generally remained above 50% during the Court’s interaction with Kenya. However, such surveys are not the continental scale. See Materu 2014, pp. 222–225.

  137. 137.

    L. Miyandazi et al. Why an African mass withdrawal from the ICC is possible, Newsweek, 2 November 2016. See also Kittrie 2016, p. 220.

  138. 138.

    Regarding the main flaw of the ‘Africa bias’ claim which is the attribution of blame on the ICC rather than that of the Security Council, see Okoth 2014.

  139. 139.

    Kittrie 2016, p. 213; Stone 2015, p. 288; Swart 2002, p. 1589.

  140. 140.

    Ibid.

  141. 141.

    Kittrie 2016, p. 216; Rodman 2014, p. 5.

  142. 142.

    Ibid.

  143. 143.

    Burke-White 2005, p. 565; Rodman 2014, pp. 14 et seq.

  144. 144.

    M. Newman, Israel announces it won’t cooperate with UN Gaza probe, The Times of Israel, 12 November 2014.

  145. 145.

    Kersten 2016, p. 169.

  146. 146.

    Mnookin 2012, p. 145.

  147. 147.

    P. Hayner, Does the ICC advance the interests of justice? Open Democracy, 4 November 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/priscilla-hayner/does-icc-advance-interests-of-justice (accessed 20 May 2017).

  148. 148.

    Haaretz, Palestinian officials say U.S. threatens ‘severe steps’ if leaders sue Israel in world court, 1 February 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-1.769034 (accessed 2 February 2017).

  149. 149.

    See M. Bard, United Nations: The UN Relationship with Israel, Jewish Virtual Library, 2017, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-u-n-israel-relationship (accessed 5 April 2017); Collins 2016, p. 149; L. Harkov, Netanyahu: UN anti-Israel bias hasn’t changed since ‘Zionism is racism’ libel’, The Jerusalem Post, 5 January 2016. See also J. Muravchik, The UN and Israel: a history of discrimination, World Affairs, December 2013.

  150. 150.

    Rodman similarly asserts that this approach should be adopted for the general operation of the Court and in dealing with situations in ongoing conflict. According to Rodman, the Court needs to adopt ‘a politically grounded legalism’ so as to conduct consensus building activities amongst other stakeholders. See Rodman 2014, pp. 27, 30.

  151. 151.

    Ambos 2016, p. 240; Bassiouni 2001; Reydams 2011, p. 337; Werle and Jessberger 2014, pp. 73–74.

  152. 152.

    The Eichmann case is viewed as one of the groundbreaking applications of the principle of universal jurisdiction. That is even though the Court employed the ‘protective principle of nationality’ instead of universal jurisdiction. The prosecution was conducted in the absence of any territorial and personal links between the prosecuting State and the accused. See Supreme Court of Israel, Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, Judgment, Supreme Court of Israel 336/61, 29 May 1962; ICJ, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002 at p. 3, para 41. See also Alvarez 2009, p. 27; Hanna 2008, pp. 323–324; and Kleffner 2008, pp. 283, 286.

  153. 153.

    Werle and Jessberger 2014, p. 75.

  154. 154.

    Reydams 2011, p. 338; Werle and Jessberger 2014, pp. 74 et seq.

  155. 155.

    Alvarez 2009, p. 27; Werle and Jessberger 2014, p. 77.

  156. 156.

    Van den Herik 2009, pp. 1117–1131. The term génocidaires is widely used in Rwanda to refer to those who were involved in the Rwandan genocide or who have ‘blood on their hands’.

  157. 157.

    Jessberger 2014, pp. 168–70.

  158. 158.

    C. Silver, Top Israeli officials face arrest in Spain, South Africa, The Electronic Intifada, 17 November 2015.

  159. 159.

    Reydams 2011, p. 348. See also Jessberger 2014, p. 166.

  160. 160.

    Belgium reportedly limited the application of Universal jurisdiction in its jurisdiction following the suggestion by Donald Rumsfeld that if it does not do so there would be pressure for NATO to withdraw from Belgium. See Human Rights Watch, Belgium: universal jurisdiction law repealed, 1 August 2003, https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed (accessed 31 May 2017). See also Alvarez 2009, p. 28; Cryer et al. 2014, p. 62; L. King, On learning lessons: Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law under threat, The Electronic Intifada, 24 June 2003.

  161. 161.

    Reydams 2011, pp. 348–349. See also Jessberger 2014, p. 167.

  162. 162.

    Ministry of Justice (UK) and Kenneth Clarke QC, Press release: Universal jurisdiction, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-jurisdiction (accessed 12 December 2016).

  163. 163.

    Reydams 2011, p. 350.

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

  165. 165.

    El Zeidy 2008, pp. 283–285.

  166. 166.

    Ibid.

  167. 167.

    The ICTY and the ICTR were the result of Security Council Resolutions 827 and 955, respectively. See UNSC 1993 and 1994.

  168. 168.

    Stan and Nedelsky 2013, above n. 1, p. 44.

  169. 169.

    K. Iliopoulos, Will anyone be held accountable for war crimes in Gaza? Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/will-anyone-be-held-accountable-for-war-crimes-in-gaza/ (accessed 13 December 2016).

  170. 170.

    Rodman 2014, pp. 6, 8.

  171. 171.

    Azarova 2015; S. Westbrook, Israel excluded from Italy military exercises after protests, BDS, 20 October 2014.

  172. 172.

    Jo and Simmons 2014, p. 19.

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Adem, S.H. (2019). Perspectives on the Intervention of the ICC in Palestine. In: Palestine and the International Criminal Court. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 21. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-291-0_6

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