Abstract
I must now return to the basic metaphysical unit — the event — represented by the function ‘fx.’ Much of what needs to be said now cannot be derived simply from a consideration of the linguistic element but if anything can be said significantly it can be only on the basis of an intuiting of what there is. The problem as I see it now seems to be this: ‘fx’ represents a structure — the structure that is of the event. What kinds of things can be named such that their names can be used to implement ‘fx’?
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© 1956 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Kattsoff, L.O. (1956). Functions and Facts. In: Logic and the Nature of Reality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9282-8_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9282-8_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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