Abstract
Philosophers have recognized for some time that counterfactual conditionals like
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(1)
If Sam had come to Eve’s party, he would have enjoyed himself present problems. Of these, two are the most important. First A counterfactual conditional cannot be translated in the usual way by means of the horseshoe of material implication. What, then, is its logical form? Second. A counterfactual seems to describe not a fact but an unreality. Thus, in (1) a situation, namely, Sam’s coming to the party, which, it is admitted, has not happened to Sam, that is, is unreal, is further determined by another unreality, namely Sam’s enjoying himself
present problems.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Wilson, F. (1986). Laws, Accidental Generalities, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In: Laws and other Worlds. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 31. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4652-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4652-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8567-0
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