The Metaphysics of Identity in Fazang’s Huayan Wujiao Zhang: The Inexhaustible Freedom of Dependent Origination

Abstract

Fazang’s arguments in his Treatise on the Five Teachings of Huayan provide a philosophical foundation for the Avatamsaka Sutra’s rich and suggestive imagery. This chapter focuses on one of Fazang’s central arguments in that treatise, namely, his argument that mutually reliant dharmas are mutually identical. The chapter presents the background context for Fazang’s argument, reconstructs the argument’s logical structure, interprets the central concepts appearing therein, and explains why Fazang might have found plausible his argument’s premises. Specific discussion points include: the non-duality of existence and emptiness; relations between causes and their conditions; the meaning of creation and identity; connections with the ti-yong paradigm; Fazang’s analogy of the ten coins. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of Fazang’s metaphysics for contemporary discussions of substance and ontological foundations.

Appendix: Notes on Methodology

Several kinds of English-language scholarship examine Fazang’s claims about mutual identity. Some are expository, focused on paraphrasing claims, reorganizing argument presentation, and adding illustrative examples (see Cook 1977 and Cleary 1983). Others are comparative, contrasting Fazang’s claims with similar theses from other philosophical traditions and cultural contexts (King 1979 and Fahy 2012). Some are heuristic, providing warrants for Fazang’s claims without regard for their textual basis (see Jones 2009 and Jones 2010a). Others are anachronistic, interpreting Fazang’s claims with distinctively modern resources such as set theory or Jungian psychology (see Priest 2009 and Odin 1982). Some, finally, mystify Fazang, taking his use of paradoxical-sounding language to indicate an embrace of genuine contradictions (see Wright 1982).

This chapter’s approach to reconstruction and interpretation differs from each of these efforts in (at least one of) four ways. First, it is charitable rather than mystifying: it presumes that Fazang does not endorse contradictory claims. Second, it is historically sensitive rather than anachronistic, restricted to principles and warrants with which Fazang likely would have been familiar. Third, it is textually grounded rather than heuristic, focused on claims and arguments as they actually appear in Fazang’s writings. Fourth and finally, it is analytic rather than expository or comparative, honoring four prescriptions for rhetorical style:

• 1. Presume that claims admit of adequate formulation in logically manipulable sentences.

• 2. Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence.

• 3. Avoid substantive use of metaphor and other devices the propositional content of which outstrips their semantic content.

• 4. Work with well-understood primitive concepts, and concepts analyzable with reference thereto (Rea 2013: 574).

In this chapter, respecting these prescriptions involves interpreting central concepts, identifying warrants and missing premises, reconstructing argument structure, and explaining inferential transitions within arguments.

Analytic reconstructions have their limitations. For example, they risk obscuring narrative insights, weakening metaphorical content for methodological rather than substantial reasons, and rationalizing the ineffable (see Cho 2002). In some cases – perhaps including this chapter – they also place high demands on reader attention. Perhaps such costs are less important in a philosophical context than they would be in a context oriented toward theology, praxis, or aesthetics. In any case, shouldering them makes possible several benefits: analytic reconstructions enhance cross-cultural understanding by restricting themselves to propositional contents the meaning of which do not depend upon specific experiences or practices; they help to reveal the extent to which semantic contents are irreducibly non-propositional; and, by virtue of their style being familiar and popular among contemporary European and Anglo-American philosophers, they make philosophy from non-European cultures and traditions more accessible.

This chapter displays many of these benefits. Consider, first, the reconstruction of the logical structure of Fazang’s argument (Sect. 13.3). The reconstructed argument is logically valid: each subargument’s conclusion follows from respective premises in accordance with familiar and well-understood rules of good deductive reasoning. In this respect, the reconstruction improves upon Cook’s analysis, which relies heavily upon examples and metaphors (Cook 1977: 64–66); and it improves upon Liu’s analysis, which inverts the inferential relations between Fazang’s premises and conclusions (Liu 1979: 407–409). Moreover, no premise in the reconstruction is prima-facie self-contradictory and the premise set taken together is jointly consistent. In this respect, the reconstruction improves upon Wright’s approach, which presumes that Fazang “violates the logical rule of non-contradiction” (Wright 1982: 325). Finally, each premise in the reconstructed argument is semantically precise. In this respect, the reconstruction improves upon Park’s analysis, which relies heavily upon examples and unexplicated technical concepts (Park 2008: 164–166).

Consider, next, the interpretation of the content of Fazang’s argument (Sect. 13.4). It avoids appealing to metaphors such as merging (Chang 1971: 139) and inside/outside (Ziporyn 2003: 508). It avoids “scare-quoting” concepts (see Ziporyn 2003: 509). It also relies upon a small set of primitive concepts (such as determination) and illustrates those concepts with several intuitive examples. Further, the interpretation recognizes that Fazang relativizes property possession to specific respects (Sects. 13.3.1 and 13.4.2). This departs from several other analyses (such as Cook 1970 and Liu 1979). While Ziporyn adopts a similar approach, this interpretation departs from Ziporyn’s by identifying the respects as presentations rather than times, subjective perspectives (how “we happen to be viewing”), or some combination thereof (see Ziporyn 2003: 508). In doing so, the interpretation shows that certain criticisms of Fazang’s argument – for example, that if Fazang is correct, the others cannot be identical with A because the others do not exist when A exists and yet identity requires that each relatum exists – are misplaced (see Ziporyn 2003: 509–510). Moreover, the interpretation identifies relatively precise, clear, and logically manipulable principles that support Fazang’s reasoning. This differs from analyses that take Fazang’s reasoning to be based upon a vague “ideal of the round” (see Liu 1979: 217–219; Liu 1982: 62, 65, 69; Jones 2010b: 227). It also reveals that Cook’s analysis, according to which mutual identity among dharmas follows from their common emptiness, is only partially correct (see Cook 1977: 373). For although each dharma’s emptiness entails that dharma’s creation by and identity with others relative to the same presentation as well as its creation and identifying of those others relative to another presentation, these entailments obtain only by virtue of the ti-yong paradigm (Sect. 13.4.3). Finally, because the interpretation points toward foundational presumptions of Fazang’s reasoning (Sect. 13.5.1), it makes Fazang’s metaphysics accessible and relevant to contemporary Anglo-American metaphysicians (see Sect. 13.6.2).

These benefits do not, of course, establish this chapter’s methodology as superior to alternatives. The chapter does not address soteriological issues, such as the way in which Fazang’s choice of language might help to induce particular experiential states or the way in which his conclusions might illuminate or rationalize particular Buddhist practices (see Wright 1982). Nor does it contextualize Fazang’s argument relative to other Buddhist traditions (see Liu 1979). Nor does it reveal the way in which Fazang’s doctrine of mutual identity through different essence coheres with his other distinctive metaphysical theses (see Cook 1977). However, the chapter’s benefits provide good prima-facie reason to suppose that the underlying methodology is appropriate and legitimate for facilitating cross-cultural understanding and engagement.