Abstract
Contemporary Sino-Indian relations reveal a trend accommodating much-needed bilateral comprehensiveness—a consequence of new variables entering the relationship. This chapter examines at a generic level the primary determinants influencing bilateral relations, with the narrative adhering to understanding established and newer variables that go into foreign policy decision-making vis-á-vis each other. In political terms, pegged along with the contested boundary dispute is the Tibet issue that possesses antithetical characteristics for both countries—as a strong domestic determinant for China in its relations with India and a powerful strategic constraint for India in its relations with China. In strategic terms, the Indo–US nuclear deal of 2005 and growing competition for influence in the Indian Ocean by the two countries are recent and fast-evolving strategic developments posing the potential to influence bilateral relations. Adopting a critical tone—a constant feature running through the paper—and identifying disjunctions in the bilateral, this chapter interprets Sino-Indian relations by establishing their differing perceptions and behaviour towards each other.
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Notes
- 1.
See Government of India (2003). The declaration stated: ‘The two sides agreed to each appoint a Special Representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.’
- 2.
An agreement consisting of nine articles to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LAC was signed on 7 September 1993. Despite regular infractions, this agreement has held.
- 3.
The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) was signed by both countries on 23 October 2013, during the Indian prime minister’s visit to China. The BDCA, containing ten articles, is to be seen as part of the welter of agreements related to the boundary dispute the two sides have signed in the past two decades. See the text at http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/newsDetails.aspx?NewsId=437&BId=1, accessed on 25 October 2013. Also see Frederic Grare (2013).
- 4.
After the twenty-first round of boundary talks between Bhutan and China held in August 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct a joint technical field survey in the Pasamlung area in Bumthang in the first week of September. See ‘Bhutan–China Border Talks Agree on Joint Technical Field Survey in Pasamlung’, at: http://bhutanobserver.bt/7754-bo-news-about-bhutanchina_border_talks_agree_on_joint_technical_field_survey_in_pasamlung.aspx#sthash.84Hdm70S.dpuf, accessed on 12 October 2013.
- 5.
‘Legal Issues Implicated by the Dalai Lama’s Devolution of Power’, memorandum prepared by the Tibet Justice Center (May 2011, p. 4), at http://www.tibetjustice.org/dalailamadevolution/DevolutionMemo.pdf, accessed on 22 August 2011.
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
Lobsang Sangay was the first Tibetan to earn the doctor of juridical science (SJD) degree from Harvard Law School. His dissertation was titled ‘Democracy in Distress: Is Exile Polity a Remedy? A Case Study of Tibet’s Government in Exile’. The success of the Tibetan government in exile stems primarily from the ‘cohesion, resiliency, and determination of the Tibetans as an ethnic group’ to preserve their cultural heritage and the freedom to practice their religion and transmit the Tibetan ethos to successive generations. See Yossi Shain (1991, p. 200).
- 8.
In an interview to a popular Indian weekly, Lobsang Sangay made an interesting observation: ‘Before 1959, there was a border between India and Tibet, and there was no requirement for such kind of huge defence budget [for India].’ See Ashish Kumar Sen’s interview with Lobsang Sangay, Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile), Outlook (16 May 2011).
- 9.
The sensitivity shown by Beijing towards Tibet also extends to the Internet. A landmark initiative by Wang Lixiong, a prominent Chinese intellectual on Tibet, to conduct an online dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens on 21 May 2010 generated 282 questions, till the authorities stepped in and the Google Moderator webpage was shut down by Chinese Internet censors. See Perry Link (2010).
- 10.
See Lei Guang (2004).
- 11.
See the text of the suo-motu statement made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on civilian nuclear energy cooperation with the United States to Parliament at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/suomotuu.htm, accessed on 10 October 2011.
- 12.
See Jing-dong Yuan (2005, pp. 150–174).
- 13.
‘President Discusses Strong US–India Partnership in New Delhi’, White House, Office of the Press Secretary (3 March 2006), at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060303-5.html, accessed on 12 January 2012. Also see, Cheng Ruisheng (2008, cited from p. 21).
- 14.
See Li Jinming and Li Dexia (2003).
- 15.
Indian Navy, India’s Maritime Military Strategy, at http://indiannavy.nic.in/maritime_strat.pdf
- 16.
- 17.
Two significant bureaucratic stakeholders deciding India’s relations with China include the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). A reading of their annual reports presents contrasting views. The perspective of the MEA on China is: ‘The focus is on enhancing mutually beneficial cooperation while simultaneously addressing differences’ (see ‘MEA Foreign Relations: China’, at http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=50042452, accessed on 12 October 2011).
The MoD in its annual report states: ‘India is conscious and watchful of the implications of China’s evolving military profile in the immediate and extended neighbourhood’ (see Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2010–11, at http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html, accessed on 12 October 2011).
- 18.
Pan Wei (2007). Professor Pan Wei of the School of International Studies, Peking University, says in his paper: ‘India has periodically elected leaders, but the Indian government is virtually abusing its people; while Chinese communist government is not truly elected, but it well [sic] takes care of people’s welfare like parents.’
- 19.
About India’s new air fields, see: ‘India Re-activating Air Strip in Arunachal’, at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-re-activating-air-strip-in-arunachal-150768&cp, accessed on 26 November 2011. With the decision to reactivate the strategic Vijayanagar advanced landing ground in Arunachal Pradesh, India has a third air base in the state after Tuting and Mechuka. The new base is located at the strategic tri-junction of India, China and Myanmar in the Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Also see, He Zude and Fang Wei (2011a, b).
- 20.
See Peter Kien-hong Yu (2000).
- 21.
There are exceptions though, with a few Chinese scholars taking interest in understanding how India has emerged as a software power despite having a low technological base and how states like Kerala regularly elect communist governments and have successfully introduced land reforms, achieved high levels of social development, empowered women and democratised and empowered village councils to run their own affairs—a model the CCP finds interesting to study. See Jinxin Huang (2005, cited from p. 632).
- 22.
On 17 March 2014, the first part of the Lt. Gen. Henderson Brooks–Brig. P.S. Bhagat report was uploaded by Australian scholar Neville Maxwell, author of the critically acclaimed India’s China War.
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Narayanan, R. (2015). India and China: Sifting the ‘Generic’ from the ‘Specific’. In: Naidu, G., Chen, M., Narayanan, R. (eds) India and China in the Emerging Dynamics of East Asia. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2138-8_8
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